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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper revisits the association between firm value (as proxied by Tobin’s Q) and whether the firm has a 
staggered board. As is well known, in the cross-section firms with a staggered board tend to have a lower 
value. Using a comprehensive sample for 1978 – 2011, we show an opposite result in the time series: firms 
that adopt a staggered board increase in firm value, while de-staggering is associated with a decrease in firm 
value. We further show that the decision to adopt a staggered board seems endogenous, and related to an ex 
ante lower firm value, which helps reconciling the existing cross-sectional results to our novel time series 
results. To explain our new results, we explore potential incentive problems in the shareholder-manager 
relationship. Short-term oriented shareholders may generate myopic incentives for the firm to underinvest in 
risky long-term projects. In this case, a staggered board may helpfully insulate the board from opportunistic 
shareholder pressure. Consistent with this, we find that the adoption of a staggered board has a stronger 
positive association with firm value for firms where such incentive problems are likely more severe: firms 
with more R&D, more intangible assets, more innovative and larger and thus likely more complex firms.  
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1. Introduction 
Discussions on the relationship between boards of directors and shareholders have occupied the center 
stage of the corporate governance debate for years, showing no sign of waning. On the one hand, advocates 
of shareholder empowerment argue that a shareholder-driven corporate model would produce value-
increasing governance arrangements by reducing the room for managerial opportunism (Bebchuk, 2005, 
2007, 2013). On the other, opponents of this model contend that “director primacy” is preferable 
(Bainbridge, 2006; Blair and Stout, 1999), as shareholder dominance would produce its own, significant set of 
agency costs (Bratton and Wachter, 2010). In particular, shareholder dominance could lead to managerial 
“short-termism”: under the pressure of empowered shareholders, managers would have incentives to pursue 
short-term returns at the expense of long-term firm value (Lipton and Rosenblum, 1991; Strine, 2006).  
Staggered (or classified) boards have long played a central role in this debate. In a staggered board, 
directors are typically grouped into three different classes. Only one class of directors stands for election each 
year, with each director being elected to a term of typically three years (i.e., a term equal in length to the 
number of classes). In contrast, in a non-staggered board, all directors stand for election every year, as they 
serve one-year terms. Hence, a staggered board’s directors are further removed from short-term shareholder 
pressure, because challengers need to win at least two election cycles to gain board majority when only about 
a third of directors stands for (re-)election each year. It is thus unsurprising that advocates of shareholder 
empowerment view staggered boards as a quintessential corporate governance failure. In this view, insulating 
directors from market discipline diminishes director accountability and encourages self-serving behaviors by 
incumbents such as shirking, empire building, and private benefits extraction (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). On the contrary, defendants of staggered boards view staggered boards 
as an instrument to preserve board stability and strengthen long-term commitments to value creation 
(Koppes, Ganske, and Haag, 1999; Lipton, Mirvis, Neff, and Katz, 2012).  
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This debate notwithstanding, the existing empirical literature supports the claim that board classification 
seems undesirable. With almost no exception, 1  extant empirical studies find that, in the cross-section, 
staggered boards are associated with lower firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Faleye, 2007) and negative abnormal returns (Mahoney and Mahoney, 
1993; Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007) at economically and 
statistically significant levels. The leading shareholder voting advisory firm, ISS, is likewise unambiguous in its 
support for board declassification and advocacy against adopting a staggered (or classified) board (ISS, 2013). 
This paper calls into question the interpretation of the evidence in this literature (i.e., as supporting the 
managerial entrenchment view of staggered boards), as we document that the negative cross-sectional 
association between staggered boards and firm value is reversed in the time series.2 We first replicate the 
existing evidence that cross-sectionally, firms with staggered boards tend to have lower firm values as measured 
by Tobin’s Q. After that, our main new finding is that in the time series, staggering up is associated with an 
increase in firm value and de-staggering is associated with a decrease in firm value. Our striking time series 
result casts a doubt on the direction of causation between firm value and staggered boards as interpreted in 
the empirical literature to date. In particular, our results suggest that causation might go from low firm value 
to the decision to adopt a staggered board rather than in the opposite direction.  
Causality concerns are of course not new. These concerns emerge because governance arrangements 
generally do not arise exogenously, but are chosen endogenously in response to firm-specific circumstances 
(Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). This complicates the interpretation of the identified cross-sectional 
negative correlation between staggered boards and firm value, since staggering decisions could be partly 
motivated by—rather than the cause of—low firm values. Despite broad acknowledgement of this problem 
in prior studies, these studies are more limited in how they address endogeneity, as they exclusively employ 

1 The sole empirical exception we could find is given by the study of Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008), which finds 
that, among others, target shareholder returns are not influenced by the presence of a staggered board. However, this 
study falls short of endorsing a favorable view of staggered boards, more limitedly suggesting that “a circumspect policy 
approach be applied when considering the adoption or dissolution of [staggering provisions].”  
2 Our results employ a longer and more comprehensive database – from 1978 to 2011, covering 3,023 firms – tracking 
more staggering and de-staggering decisions than the existing literature, including hand-collected data for 1978 – 1989 
from Cremers and Ferrell (2013). As a comparison, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Faleye (2007) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009) use data for 1995 – 2002 for a sample covering between 1,400 and 1,800 firms each year.  
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cross-sectional regressions to estimate the relation between staggering decisions and firm value. The focus on 
a cross-sectional association is largely attributable to limitations in available staggered board data and the 
difficulty of performing a time series analysis of this relation using limited data.  
As a result, an essential contribution of this paper is our use of a more comprehensive database (i.e., 
from 1978 to 2011), which allows us to consider the time series evidence as well. 3  This is particularly 
important because during the 1995 – 2002 time period used in much of the recent literature (e.g., Bebchuk 
and Cohen (2005), Faleye (2007), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)), there are very few instances of 
firms adopting a staggered board or de-staggering. However, we document that a significant proportion of 
firms staggered up during the 1978 – 1989 period (see also Cremers and Ferrell (2013)), and a likewise 
considerable proportion of firms de-staggered during the 2005 – 2011 period. 
Our main time series result, that firm value goes up if the board changes from a single class of directors 
to a staggered board (and the reverse for de-staggering), is robust and both economically and statistically 
significant. Using pooled panel Tobin’s Q regressions with firm fixed effects and the full 1978 – 2011 time 
period, we find that staggering up (down) is associated with a permanent increase (decrease) in Tobin’s Q of 
6.3%. We likewise document a positive association between changes in Tobin’s Q and changes in whether the 
firm has a staggered board, consistent with our firm fixed effects results. Economically, we find that 
staggering up (down) this year is associated with an increase (decrease) in Tobin’s Q of 3% over the next 
fiscal year, of 7.9% over the next two years and a cumulative increase of 15.3% over the next five fiscal years.  

3 Our data combines three different sets of staggered board data: (i) data from the Cremer-Ferrell (2013) hand-collected 
database for the 1978-1989 time period; (ii) a combination of data compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) and hand-collected data for the 1990-2006 time period. Indeed, the IRRC now publishes yearly volumes 
providing data on several corporate governance provisions, including staggered boards. Over the period 1990-2006, 
however, the IRRC did not publish its volumes each year. Hence, we hand-collected information on staggered boards 
for each missing year in the IRRC volumes (i.e., 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005). As the 
source for our hand-checked data, we used the SEC website database, which collects information included in the SEC 
10-K and DEF 14-A forms. These forms provide information on, among other issues, a company’s history and 
organizational structure, voting procedures, company performance, and board features, from which we are able to obtain 
data on both staggering and de-staggering decisions; (iii) a combination of data from the IRRC database and hand-
collected data for the 2007-2011 time period (using data from the SharkRepellent.net). Although IRRC volumes for the 
period 2007-2011 were annually updated, we hand-checked data for the period 2009-2011 because we found some minor 
miscoding of the staggered board data. 
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We confirm that board staggering up (down) is associated with an increase (decrease) in financial value 
by constructing portfolios of firms around the time the firm staggers up (down). For example, say a firm does 
not have a staggered board at the end of fiscal year 2000 but has one in place at the end of fiscal year 2001. 
This implies that the staggered board has been approved sometime over the “staggering transition year,” i.e., 
in case of this example, the 12-month period from the end of fiscal year 2000 to the end of fiscal year 2001. 
We then construct a portfolio that at any point in time includes only those stocks of firms during such 
transition years. The portfolio of firms in “staggering transition years” has a positive abnormal return, while 
the portfolio of firms in analogously determined “de-staggering transition years” has a negative abnormal 
return. The long-short portfolio has an annualized 4-factor alpha of about 16% (with a t-statistic of 2.24) if 
equally-weighted and about 18% (with a t-statistic of 2.35) if value-weighted. 
 A natural explanation for the sign change between the cross-sectional and time series results may be that 
the cross-sectional results are largely due to reverse causality. In particular, if having a relatively low firm value 
induces some firms to adopt a staggered board (rather than a staggered board causing a lower firm value), this 
could explain the cross-sectional result that firms with staggered boards tend to have low firm values. 
However, reverse causality could not explain the time series results, as firm value tends to go up after the 
adoption of a staggered board.  
Consistent with the hypothesis of reverse causality, we find that low firm value is a significant predictor 
of board staggering. We consider two non-linear specifications for the decision to adopt a staggered board: a 
random effects probit model and the Cox proportional hazard model. These suggest that a standard deviation 
decrease in firm value can explain 30% (probit model) to 58% (Cox model) of board staggering events. 
Conversely, we find no statistically significant association between firm value and the decision to de-stagger.  
If reverse causality can explain the negative association between firm value and staggered boards, then 
we would expect this negative association to become considerably weaker once we control for lagged firm 
value. The empirical results strongly support this conjecture. For our main cross-sectional results using 
pooled panel Tobin’s Q regressions with industry (but no firm) fixed effects over our full 1978 – 2011 period, 
we find a coefficient on the staggered board dummy of -0.041 that is strongly statistically significant (t-statistic 
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of 2.43). Adding lagged Q as a control for reverse causality to this specification, we find a coefficient on the 
staggered board dummy that is much reduced at -0.008 and statistically insignificant (t-statistic of 1.60). 
These results challenge the managerial entrenchment view of staggered boards. They also raise the 
question of how one could interpret the positive association between firm value and the decision to adopt a 
staggered board. While we cannot demonstrate any causal link, we explore an explanation based on potential 
incentive problems in the shareholder-manager relationship. The managerial entrenchment view maintains 
that an increased threat of managerial removal by the shareholders produces desirable disciplinary effects and 
thus improves firm value. The central assumption here is that firm value provides a reliable and informative 
signal about managerial performance, where low firm value efficiently triggers shareholder interference. 
However, in contexts of high asymmetric information or very noisy market prices, such signals may be 
distorted, which may engender sorting or signaling problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).  
Applied to publicly traded corporations, this means that in some cases a relatively low firm value may be 
attributable to the difficulty of firm insiders to share information about the firm’s prospects (rather than poor 
managerial performance). One example is the case where considerable firm-specific capital expenditures are 
required in order to enhance long-term firm value. Such large capital expenditures will decrease short-term 
earnings, and may lower firm value, in the near term if shareholders are less convinced about their need 
and/or may ascribe them to empire building tendencies. Alternatively, shareholders may lack the incentives or 
the ability to expend the resources required to address such information problems, especially in large, 
complex firms where sorting costs may increase exponentially (Tirole, 2006). Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique 
(2004) provide evidence that is consistent with this. They show that, while significant increases in R&D 
investments are beneficial for the firm in the long run on average, the stock market tends to underreact to 
their announcement, leading to positive abnormal stock returns for such firms on average over the next 12 
months. These results suggest that some shareholders may initially not recognize the benefits of R&D 
investments, as they usually have a long-term nature. 
Asymmetric information and long-term investments are central to many if not most modern large firms, 
whose competitive success is increasingly dependent on complex and intangible investments (Porter, 1992; 
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Zingales, 2000). Hence, if long-term investments lead to a short-term decrease in firm valuations, then an 
increased threat of managerial removal may produce myopic incentives (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Laffont 
and Tirole, 1988; Stein, 1988, 1989). That is, anticipating that low firm value may trigger shareholder 
retribution, managers may be induced to underinvest in future profitability or “posture”, i.e., increase short-
term payoffs at the expense of long-term value (Bushee, 1998; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Tirole, 
2006).  
The problem of myopic incentives and the difficulty of committing to long-term firm-specific 
investments suggest a positive account of staggered boards that can potentially explain our main empirical 
result. Specifically, directors who do not have to stand for election every year may be less susceptible to 
making myopic decisions and have longer-term incentives relative to directors who are up for re-election 
annually. Staggered boards may thus have a positive association with firm value if such boards have an 
enhanced ability to resist myopic incentives and pursue long-term and/or specific investments.  
We test this positive account of staggered boards by considering whether the positive association 
between adopting a staggered board and firm value is stronger for firms with more long-term and firm-
specific investments, more complexity, and stronger executive compensation incentives to take on more risk 
(and vice versa for de-staggering). Our empirical results strongly support such positive account. For example, 
the positive association between the adoption of a staggered board and firm value is significantly stronger 
among firms with higher R&D expenses as a fraction of their revenue, among firms with more intangible 
assets, among firms that are more successful in innovation (as measured by their patent citation counts) and 
among firms with larger size (with firm size used as a proxy for complexity as in Faleye, 2007 and Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999).4  
An alternative explanation for the positive association between staggering up and firm value is that firms 
that stagger up may simultaneously decrease other entrenching governance mechanisms. Similarly, the 
decision to adopt a staggered board may be primarily taken by firms whose other corporate governance 

4 While Faleye (2007) uses total assets as measure of firm size, we follow Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and 
measure the logarithm of a firm’s sales as measure of firm size. 
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mechanisms provide strong (and maybe strengthening) safeguards against managerial entrenchment. Using 
proxies such as forced CEO turnover, CEO – board chairman duality, and the G-Index of shareholder rights, 
we find no support for this alternative explanation. In particular, if we interact the presence of a staggered 
board with CEO – board chairman duality, we find that upon adopting a staggered board, firm value tends to 
increase more if the CEO also chairs the board. Our results suggest that having an empowered CEO only 
positively associates with firm value if complemented with a staggered board. If we interpret staggered boards 
as having more power vis-à-vis the shareholders, then we can conclude that more powerful boards and CEOs 
seem complements.  
Finally, we consider whether the positive association between the adoption of a staggered board and 
firm value is related to strong equity-based incentives that guard against managerial entrenchment. We find no 
significant interaction for ‘CEO Delta’ (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock price). However, 
the interaction between adopting a staggered board and ‘CEO Vega’ (reflecting the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to stock return volatility) is strongly positively related to firm value, suggesting that staggered 
boards are better suited to oversee compensation policies that induce effective managerial risk-taking. This 
may be because with a staggered board, both CEOs and boards may be less fearful of immediate shareholder 
retribution upon potentially bad short-term realizations of risky investment projects and can therefore afford 
to implement less conservative executive compensation incentives. 
Our interest in executive incentives is also motivated by the view that sees high executive compensation 
itself as major evidence of managerial entrenchment. Under this view, entrenched managers would be able to 
use their positional advantage to obtain returns well above the information rents needed to preserve an 
agent’s incentives (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Specifically, Faleye (2007) argues that one of the channels 
through which staggered boards promote entrenchment is a significant reduction in the effectiveness of 
executive incentives. Our evidence is not consistent with this. Rather, when we add the interaction of the 
adoption of a staggered board with the total level of CEO compensation to firm value regressions, this 
interaction has a strongly positive interaction. This suggests that staggered boards are more valuable at firms 
with a high paid CEO, potentially because these CEOs are particularly talented at the challenging task of 
9 

running complex, large organizations with a longer-term outlook – the same firms where staggered boards are 
more strongly positively associated with firm value. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related empirical 
literature. In Section 3, we present our sample and summary statistics. In Section 4, we discuss the results of 
our valuation analysis of staggered boards as well as the results of our interaction analysis. In Section 5, we 
provide robustness analysis. We conclude in Section 6.  
2.  Related Literature 
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. In the first place, we contribute to the literature on 
staggered boards and firm value. Prior studies find that, in the cross-section, having a staggered board is 
associated to a reduction in firm value (Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; 
Faleye, 2007; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Cohen and Wang, 2013). We add to these studies in two 
important ways. 
 First, we employ a longer and more comprehensive database (i.e., covering the time period 1978-2011). 
This period includes two sub-periods with substantial instances of firms either adopting a staggered board (in 
1978 – 1989) or de-staggering (in 2005 – 2011), which allows us to consider time-series evidence in addition 
to cross-sectional evidence. Second, we show that the negative cross-sectional association between staggered 
boards and firm value is reversed in the time series. This result suggests that board insulation through 
staggered elections is associated with increases, rather than decreases, of firm value over time. This is 
consistent with the findings of Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011), who document a negative market 
reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions designed to increase shareholder power, including a 
proposal to eliminate staggered boards.5  
Relatedly, we also contribute to the extensive literature that investigates the relationship between market 
discipline, governance arrangements, and firm value. Following seminal prior studies by Manne (1965) and 
Jensen (1988; 1993), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) find a negative cross-sectional correlation between 

5 This proposal was included in the 2009 Shareholder Bill of Rights Act by Senator Charles Schumer as one of several 
measures designed to provide shareholders with enhanced corporate power.  
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firm value and increased board insulation from market discipline as measured by a broad shareholder rights 
index (the “G-Index”). These results suggest that board-insulating governance arrangements in general 
promote inefficient managerial-entrenchment. Subsequent studies support this hypothesis, finding that the 
negative correlation between board-insulation and firm value holds for different subsets of G-Index 
provisions (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007))6 as 
well as for longer computation periods and in the time series (Cremers and Ferrell, 2013).  
Along the same line of inquiry, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007) document that the 
presence of a staggered board is a primary driver of the identified negative correlation between board 
insulation and lower firm value. Event studies also support the entrenchment view of board-insulating 
arrangements, both relative to their adoption (or amendments) (for a survey see Bhagat and Romano, 2002a; 
2002b) and related regulatory and case law changes (Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989; Cohen and Wang, 2013; 
Cremers and Ferrell, 2013).  
We supplement this body of work in two ways. First, we document that using pooled panel Tobin’s Q 
regressions with firm fixed effects and over our full 1978-2011 time period, the interaction term between 
staggered boards and the other provisions in the G-Index is insignificant. Second, we show that a portfolio 
strategy that buys firms around the time they adopt a staggered board and sold firms around the time they 
destagger would have earned an annual alpha of about 16%. Overall, our results challenge the entrenchment 
view of staggered boards.  
Next, we contribute to the literature examining the value relevance of a firm’s R&D and intangible 
investments. Prior studies in this strand of literature highlight two main findings. On the one hand, they 
report that investments in R&D and intangibles tend to be associated with increased productivity as well as 
higher firm value in the long term (Hirschey, 1982; Chan, Martin, and Kensinger, 1990; Chauvin and 
Hirschey, 1993; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique, 2004). On the other, they find 

6 The G-Index includes 24 governance provisions. Aiming at disentangling the most important of these provisions 
relative to the negative impact on firm value, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) introduce an entrenchment index (the 
“E-Index”) based on six of the G-Index provisions (still including staggered boards). Cremers and Nair (2005) use an 
even more restricted governance index, which is based on four of the G-Index provisions. Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
examine still different subsets of the G-Index. However, regardless of the specific subset they employ, all these studies 
find confirmation of the negative relation between board-insulating measures and firm value. 
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that the long-term benefits of such investments are regularly underestimated in the short-term, suggesting the 
existence of severe information asymmetry problems. For example, Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) 
report that firm with high R&D to equity market value (which tend to have poor past returns) earn large 
excess returns. Similarly, Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) find that investors tend to underreact to the 
announcement of increases in R&D expenditures, suggesting that they underestimate the potential cash flow 
of such investments. Further, Bushee (1998) argues that short-term institutional investors create incentives 
for corporate managers to reduce investment in R&D in order to meet short-term earnings goals. We 
supplement this literature by showing that the positive impact of staggered boards on firm value is stronger in 
firms with larger R&D expenditures and a higher fraction of intangible assets to total assets, suggesting that 
board insulation from short-term shareholder interference is especially valuable in contexts where asymmetric 
information problems are more acute.  
Further, our work relates to the literature examining how structural differences across boards affect the 
way in which firms function and how they perform (for a review see Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). 
In particular, we contribute to two strands of research within this literature: the first examines how board 
structure affects the incidence and performance sensitivity of forced CEO turnover, while the second 
investigates how CEO – board chairman duality relates to board conduct and firm performance. Concerning 
the first strand of research, the pioneering study is Weisbach (1988), who finds that forced CEO turnover is 
more sensitive to firm performance (i.e., with lower firm value predicting higher CEO turnover) in firms with 
outsider-dominated boards. This suggests that board independence increases the likelihood of effective CEO 
turnover. More closely related to our research, Faleye (2007) finds that the presence of a staggered board 
decreases both the incidence and the performance sensitivity of CEO turnover. However, testing the same 
interaction term in the time series, we find an insignificant, albeit positive, association on firm value, 
suggesting that the adoption of a staggered board is not likely to lead to less effective CEO turnover.   
Concerning the literature on CEO – board chairman duality, several studies test whether such a board 
feature gives CEOs excessive control over the board to the detriment of shareholders (Jensen, 1993; Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004). Consistent with this view, Goyal and Park (2002) find that CEO – board chairman duality 
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decreases the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Similarly, Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 
(2005) report that CEOs who also chair the board are better positioned to influence corporate decision-
making. Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), however, suggest that these results might be endogenous, 
i.e., that CEO power is simply a consequence of a demonstrated high ability to manage the firm effectively. 
This explanation is in line with the work of Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997), who find an insignificant 
impact of CEO – board duality on firm value, and Dei, Engel and Liu (2011), who show that splitting the 
CEO and board chairman roles is associated with a decrease in firm value. Consistent with Dei, Engel, and 
Liu (2011), we find that having both a staggered board and a CEO who chairs the board leads to an increase 
in firm value.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on CEO compensation incentives. From a theoretical perspective, 
the proposition that executives should be paid for performance is well settled and has been formally analyzed 
through principal-agent models in several studies (Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 
1983). From an empirical perspective, however, the existing literature can be divided into two distinct groups, 
supporting opposite models of the pay setting process.  
The first group supports an arm’s length bargaining model (premised on an active executive labor 
market (Cremers and Grinstein, 2013)), under which boards of directors negotiate compensation 
arrangements with executives in the best interest of their shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a; 1990b; 
Himmerberg and Hubbard, 2000; Hubbard, 2005). The second, instead, supports a managerial power model 
under which entrenched executives control the board and, therefore, are able to set their own compensation 
arrangements (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Under this view, the adoption of board-insulating measures such as 
staggered elections would play a central role in enabling entrenched executives to raise their pay levels 
(Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Faleye, 2007). We add to these studies by showing that, on the one hand, the 
presence of a staggered board does not seem to alter the basic incentive structure of executive pay and, on the 
other, it might even provide executives with better incentives to take efficient risk.  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
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3.1. Data Sources 
Our data come from several sources, with the overall data sample covering the time period 1978-2011. 
However, as specified in the ensuing discussion, the availability of the data varies with the different data 
sources we employ for the various variables used in our analysis.   
3.1.1. Staggered Boards 
We obtain data for the key independent variable of our study, i.e., Staggered Board[t], from two main 
sources, covering a total number of 3,023 firms. For the time period 1990-2011, as in all prior studies on the 
value impact of staggered boards (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007), 
we use the corporate governance dataset maintained by Risk Metrics, which acquired the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)). 
Since 1990, the IRRC has published volumes every 2 – 3 years providing detailed information on several 
governance provisions, including staggered boards, at about 1,500 firms (with the number of firm increasing 
up to 1,900 – 2,000 firms in more recent volumes). Starting from 2007, the IRRC publications have become 
annual. During the period 1990-2006, however, the IRRC only published volumes in the following years: 
1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. To remedy the lack of available data for the years in 
which the IRRC did not publish its volumes, most prior studies using the IRRC dataset assume that the 
governance provisions reported as in place in the years of a published volume were in place in the year 
following that volume’s publication (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie, 2007; Cremers and Ferrell, 2013). In contrast to these studies, we hand-checked all missing 
years in the 1994 – 2006 time period using proxy statements from the SEC’s EDGAR website.7 An advantage 
of this method of filling in missing years is that we do not assume away changes in staggering-up and de-

7 In particular, the SEC 10-K and DEF 14-A forms provide information on voting procedures and board features, from 
which we are able to obtain data on both staggering and de-staggering decisions.In addition, we also hand checked the 
accuracy of the IRRC data for the time period 2007 -2001 by using data from SharkRepellent.net. We did so because, 
while IRRC volumes were annually update during this period, we found some minor miscoding of the staggered board 
data in 2009-2011. 
 
14 

staggering decisions that might have taken place between the years with available IRRC data and subsequent 
years without available IRRC data. 
Further, for the time period 1978-1989, we use data from Cremers and Ferrell (2013), who 
comprehensively hand-collected information on firm-level corporate governance provisions for these years, 
including information on the same provisions tracked by the IRRC for the period 1990-2011 and, in 
particular, staggered boards. As argued by Cremers and Ferrell (2013), including pre-1990 data is particularly 
valuable because the 1980s were characterized by significant time variation in corporate governance features 
(including board staggering) as a result of the important changes that took place in those years in takeover 
activity, the law surrounding the use of anti-takeover defenses, and the strength of shareholder rights.  
As a result, the use of a more comprehensive database, i.e., from 1978 to 2011, allows us to track more 
staggering and de-staggering decisions than the existing literature and, therefore, to document both the cross-
sectional and time-series dimension of the relationship between staggered boards and firm value.  
3.1.2. Main Dependent Variables 
Since our main focus is on the value relevance of staggered boards, the main dependent variable in our 
analysis is firm value. Consistent with several prior studies investigating the relation between governance 
arrangements and firm value (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Lang and Stultz, 
1994; Yermack, 1996; Daines, 2001; and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), we measure firm value using 
Tobin’s Q (Q[t]). We define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets (as 
in Fama and French, 1992) and use Compustat as the relevant data source.  
As an additional measure of changes to firm value, we use the stock returns surrounding changes of the 
staggered board structure, obtaining stock return data for both our equally weighted portfolio analysis and 
value weighted portfolio analysis from the CRSP database (see Section 4.1.3 below). From the same database, 
we also obtain data on the number of outstanding shares and share prices, which we employ in our value 
weight portfolio analysis. 
3.1.3. Other Controls 
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In our analysis, we always include the following control variables: Ln (Assets)[t], Delaware Incorporation[t], 
ROA[t], CAPX/Assets[t], and R&D/ Sales[t]. Additionally, in a few regressions and in our robustness tests, we 
also include G-Index[t], Ln (G-Index)[t], Ln (Assets)[t], Insider Ownership[t], and Insider Ownership2[t], to replicate more 
closely the results in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005). We provide brief definitions of all the controls in Table 1.  
Among the variables appearing in our extended set of controls, the G-Index[t], introduced by Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), is a composite of twenty-four pro-management governance features—including 
staggered boards—which measures the strength of shareholders rights by adding one point if any of the 
provisions included in the index is present. Higher scores on the G-Index[t] indicate the presence of a larger 
number of pro-management provisions and, therefore, weaker shareholder rights.  
In computing the G-Index[t], we replicate Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) to isolate Staggered Board[t] from the 
other index provisions. As concerns G-Index[t] data, we obtain data from the Cremers-Ferrell dataset for the 
period 1978-1989 and the Risk Metrics (formerly IRRC) dataset for the period 1990-2011. Because, as noted 
above, IRRC volumes are only available for certain years during the time period 1990-2006, for all provisions 
other than Staggered Board[t] we assume that any change took place in the year when it was first reported. 
Further, because after 2006 the IRRC volumes do not provide data on all the governance features included in 
the G-Index[t], we assume that values for the G-Index[t] provisions that are missing during the period 2007 –
2011 are the same as the values reported in 2006.  
Concerning the variables appearing in our extended test of controls, we compute Insider Ownership[t] as 
follows. For the time period 1986-2006, we use annual data from Compact Disclosure, which provides 
monthly updated financial information on the SEC filings of U.S. publicly traded companies with assets in 
excess of $5 million. Specifically, we use the data item SO, reporting data on the combined equity holdings of 
a firm’s officers and directors, whom we refer to as insiders (as standard in the literature). Because the change 
in the information content between two consecutive CD-ROMs in Compact Disclosure is fairly small and we 
do not have access to all the CDs, we use the October CDs to produce our data set for the period 1986-2006. 
The disadvantage of using Compact Disclosure for our study is that it primarily covers NYSE and AMEX 
16 

firms before 1995. Accordingly, we mainly use Insider Ownership[t] in robustness tests, as this control 
substantially reduces our sample size. 
Finally, we use Compustat as our primary data source for the several control variables reflecting the 
financials of the firm that we use throughout our analysis (e.g., ROA[t], CAPX/Assets[t], and R&D/ Sales[t]).  
3.1.4. Interacted Variables 
To supplement our firm value analysis, we also study the interacted impact on firm value of staggered 
boards and a series of variables of interests, including investment policy and operational complexity variables, 
board features and governance provisions variables, and executive compensation variables. 
i. Investment Policy and Operational Complexity Variables 
In order to consider whether, and how, the relation between staggered boards and firm value changes 
depending on a firm’s investment policy and level of complexity, we employ the following variables: R&D/ 
Sales[t], Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t], Ranked Patent Citation Count[t], and Firm Size[t] (using the logarithm of a 
firm’s sales as proxy for complexity as in Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). For most of these variables, 
we are able to obtain data for the full time period we consider from the Compustat database (the annual 
update file). The exception is Ranked Patent Citation Count[t] , which we derive from the NBER U.S. Patents 
Citation File for 1978 – 2003. 
ii. Board Features and Governance Provisions Variables 
We consider whether, and how, the relation between staggered boards and firm value changes depending 
on specific board features and/or governance provisions, using the following variables: CEO Turnover[t], CEO-
Board Chairman Duality[t], and G-Index[t].  
As concerns CEO Turnover[t], which we define as a binary variable equal to one if the CEO was forced to 
leave office in a given fiscal year and zero otherwise, we obtain data from Jenter and Kanaan (2010). As their 
dataset covers 1991 to 2003, we only compute CEO Turnover[t] for that time period. For CEO-Board Chairman 
Duality[t], we use data for 1996 – 2011 from the BoardEx database and the Risk Metrics (formerly IRRC) 
database, both of which provide information on a director’s characteristics.  
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iii.  Executive Compensation Variables. 
We consider whether, and how, the relation between staggered boards and firm value changes depending 
on executive compensation incentives, by employing the following variables: CEO Delta[t], CEO Vega[t], and 
CEO Total Compensation[t], which we derive from the ExecuComp database. For CEO Delta[t] and CEO Vega[t] 
(which we calculate following the methodology implemented by Core and Guay (2002), as standard in the 
literature), the ExecuComp database covers the time period 1992 – 2010. For CEO Total Compensation[t], 
instead, the ExecuComp database provides data from 1992 to 2011.
Again, as in our other interaction analyses, we observe that the inclusion of executive compensation 
interaction terms—and, in particular CEO Vega[t] and CEO Delta[t]—substantially reduces our overall sample 
size.
3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of all the variables we use. In the overall cross-section nearly 53% 
of all firms have a staggered board. The average Q[t] in our sample is 1.581 with a standard deviation of 0.867. 
In results that are not tabulated, we compare the averages of the control variables across the sample of firms 
with and without staggered boards. Overall, we find no substantial differences across the two samples.  
3.3. Staggering and De-staggering 
Figure 1 presents the percentage of firms with a staggered board in our sample each year from 1978 to 
2011, documenting cross-sectional changes over time. As shown by Figure 1, there is substantial time 
variation. In the period of 1978 to 1983 we observe a slow trend of staggering up. This trend rapidly 
accelerates starting in 1984 until 1992. The period 1992 – 2006 is characterized by a fairly stable ratio of firms 
with a staggered board in the overall cross section, at around 60%. After 2006, the ratio of firms with a 
staggered board steadily declines, until reaching a percentage of about 45% in 2011.  
Figure 2 presents an analysis that aims to disentangle the time variation from the cross-sectional 
variation occurring from new firms entering the database. We do so by visualizing the dynamics of staggering 
up and staggering down within a specific group (cohorts) of firms through time, where no new firms are 
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entering each cohort subsequently. Specifically, we study the dynamics of six cohorts of firms (hence six lines 
are shown in Figure 2): (i) firms with a staggered board in 1978, (ii) firms without a staggered board in 1978, 
(iii) firms with a staggered board in 1990, (iv) firms without a staggered board in 1990, (v) firms with a 
staggered board in 2000, and (vi) firms without a staggered board in 2000.  
This approach allows us to distinguish three crucial sub-periods within our overall time period spanning 
from 1978 to 2011. The first, from 1978 to 1989, corresponds to the “takeover era”; the second, from 1990 
to 2000, to the “bull market era”; and the third, from 2001 to 2011, to “the post-Enron era.” Substantial 
corporate governance changes occurred across these sub-periods. The takeover era (i.e., 1978 –1989) saw the 
rise of activist investors (e.g., private equity firms) and the junk bond market, which together fueled the 
growth of takeover activity. On the other hand, this was also the era of the second generation of anti-takeover 
state legislation, which led to significant variation in the use of firm-level antitakeover defenses. The bull 
market era (i.e., 1990 – 2000) was characterized by rising stock prices and relatively few changes in 
shareholder rights and board structure. Finally, the post-Enron era (i.e., 2001 – 2011) has witnessed the 
introduction of substantial regulatory reforms at the federal level, as a result of both the corporate governance 
scandals of the early 2000s (leading to the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and the financial crisis of 
2007 – 2009 (leading to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act).  
With this motivation in mind for the choice of our sub-periods, we note that among the firms with a 
staggered board in 1978, only a few de-staggered until 2005, with nearly 93% remaining instead staggered in 
2004 (out of the firms still in the sample). Starting from 2005, a large number of firms in this cohort have de-
staggered, with only about 71% of the surviving firms in this cohort remaining staggered in 2011. 8 
Conversely, among the firms without a staggered board in 1978, almost half have staggered-up from 1979 to 
1989. About 40% of the firms in this cohort that adopted a staggered board in the early 1980s de-staggered in 
the following years, with the number of firms that de-staggered past 2005 reaching nearly 30% of the cohort 
sample. 9  Comparing the 1990 and 2000 cohorts to the 1978 cohort, we observe analogous trends. In 

8 The 1978 cohort of firms with staggered boards starts with 195 firms in 1978, from which 42 firms survive until 2011. 
9 The 1978 cohort of firms with no staggered board contains 684 firms in 1978, from which 146 firms survive until 
2011. 
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particular, among the firms with a staggered board in 1990 as well as among the firms with a staggered board 
in 2000, many have remained staggered until 2005 and began to increasingly de-stagger afterward. We thus 
note that when a firm staggers up, it typically takes a while before it decides to de-stagger. For example, none 
of the firms that staggered up in the early 2000s has de-staggered in recent years. 
Lastly, we observe that over the 1995 – 2002 time period that has been the focus of most prior studies 
on staggered boards (e.g., Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009), there 
is almost no time variation. The lack of time series variation in the key variable of our analysis, Staggered 
Board[t], in that period might thus be viewed as a limitation to those studies.  
4.    Results 
4.1. Staggered Boards and Firm Value 
We begin our empirical analysis with the study of the association between staggered boards and firm 
value, proceeding in four steps. First, we investigate the cross-sectional correlation between staggered boards 
and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q (Q[t]), replicating similar analyses in existing studies and, in 
particular, in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005).10 Second, we consider the time-series dimensions of the relation 
between staggered boards and firm value, using both pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions including firm fixed 
effects and pooled panel first differences regressions. Third, we employ portfolio analysis, i.e., constructing 
portfolios of firms around the time a firm staggers up (down), as an additional method to verify the value 
impact of staggered boards. Fourth, in order to further investigate the sign change that we find between the 
cross-sectional and the time series analyses, we consider reverse causality. 
We start with some preliminary observations. We selected our control variables so as to retain as many 
observations as possible.  Thus, as compared to Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), who include in their regressions 
an extended set of controls (i.e., G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Assets)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Delaware 
Incorporation[t-1], Insider Ownership[t-1], Insider Ownership2[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/ Sales[t-1]), we 

10 One difference in our cross-sectional analysis and the analysis of Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) is that they use industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q, defined as the firm’s Q minus the median Q in the firm’s industry in the observation year. Gormley 
and Matsa (2013), however, suggest that industry-adjusting of Q may produce inconsistent estimates and can distort 
inference.  For this reason, we use a fixed effects estimator at the industry level rather than industry-adjusting Q.  
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exclude those controls that significantly reduce sample size.  Specifically, we exclude Insider Ownership[t-1] (and 
the derived Insider Ownership2[t-1]), G-Index[t-1] (and the derived Ln (G-Index)[t-1]), and Ln (Firm Age)[t-1]. In our 
robustness analysis, however, we employ the extended set of controls used in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), 
and find that our results become qualitatively stronger. Additionally, as in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), we 
exclude firms with a dual class structure from our analysis.  
For all tables in this paper, we consistently show the t-statistics of all coefficients based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. For the staggered board coefficient, we also show the t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors that are not clustered. The motivation for employing standard errors clustered by firm 
is to incorporate the correlation of regression residuals across time for a given firm, which is common 
(Petersen, 2009).  
4.1.1. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Table 3 presents the results of the value impact of staggered boards in the cross-section of firms. Since 
our full panel covers 34 years of data on Staggered Board[t], we are able to perform sub-sample analyses in order 
to establish robustness of cross-sectional results in different sample periods. Columns (1) through (5) present 
the results for each of the periods we consider: i.e., 1978 – 2011, 1978 – 1989, 1990 – 2000, 2001 – 2011, and 
1995 – 2002. In particular, Column (1) presents results for our full time period, while Column (5) presents 
results for the same time period used in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005).  
Consistent with the findings of Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), in Column (1) we find that the effect of 
Staggered Board[t-1] on Q[t] is negative and both statistically and economically significant, leading to a 2.6%       
(= -0.041/1.581) reduction in Q[t]. We also note that statistical significance is robust across both the standard 
error adjustment techniques we employ. However, the t-statistics become smaller with clustering by firm, 
although they remain significant at the 5% confidence level.11 

11 For robustness, in the Online Appendix Table A.1, we also control the regressions of Table 3, column (1) for the 
extended set of controls used in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005). Specifically, in column (1) of Table A.1, we employ all the 
controls of the extended set except Insider Ownership [t-1] (and Insider Ownership2 [t-1]), while in column (2) of Table A.1, we 
employ all the controls including Insider Ownership [t-1] (and Insider Ownership2 [t-1]). For both columns the negative coefficient 
estimate of the association between Q[t] and Staggered Board[t-1] persists and remains statistically significant. 
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Next, we move to the analysis appearing in Column (5), which includes the same controls as in Bebchuk 
and Cohen (2005) and includes firm industry (using four-digit SIC codes) and year fixed effects.12  Reflecting 
the lack of time series variation, the coefficient estimate of Staggered Board[t-1] becomes insignificant with a t-
statistics of 1.25 once we cluster the standard errors by firm.  The economic significance, however, remains 
similar to that in Column (1), as having a staggered board is associated with a 2.7% (= -0.045/1.644) decrease 
in Q[t] in Column (5). Overall, these results are consistent with Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), though they 
report stronger economic and statistical significance (using robust standard errors that do not seem to be 
clustered).  
Turning to the robustness of our cross-sectional results in different sample periods, we find similarly 
negative coefficient estimates of the association between Q[t] and Staggered Board[t-1]  across all the relevant sub-
periods (i.e., 1978 – 1989, 1990 – 2000, and 2001 – 2011). However, while coefficient estimates are strongly 
significant (at 1% confidence level) during the 1990-2000 sample period, they become insignificant during 
both the 1978 – 1989 and 2001 – 2011 sample periods once we cluster standard errors by firm. 
4.1.2. Time Series Analysis 
While the results of Table 2 confirm that adopting of a staggered board is associated with lower firm 
value in the cross section, endogeneity concerns arise as to the direction of causation. As broadly 
acknowledged in the existing literature, these concerns emerge because governance arrangements are chosen 
in response to firm-specific circumstances (Adam, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). Hence, it is unclear 
whether the identified negative association between staggered boards and firm value can be attributed to a 
causal link or, for example, to omitted-and-correlated variables. In particular, given the high autocorrelation 
of Q[t],13 it is possible that staggering decisions could be partly motivated by—rather than the cause of—low 
firm value. For example, firms with low value could decide to stagger up because they perceive themselves as 

12 Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) use two-digit rather than four-digits SIC codes as we do. In robustness, however, we show 
that our results remain the same even using two-digit SIC codes or using the Fama – French 49 industry definitions.  
13 Note that while the first order auto-correlation coefficient of Q[t] is 0.869, higher orders gradually decline. However, 
even the fifth order auto-correlation coefficient is still high, at 0.65. 
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more vulnerable to opportunistic raiders or to avoid interference by shareholders with short-term horizons—
or indeed to entrench themselves.  
We can significantly mitigate—though not eliminate—such endogeneity concerns by using the 
considerable time series variation in staggered boards. We first do so using pooled panel Tobin’s Q 
regressions with firm fixed effects. Including the firm fixed effect is equivalent to removing the time-invariant 
component in both Q[t] and Staggered Boards[t-1], therefore reducing the potential bias resulting from omitted 
time-invariant variables at the firm level. Once we include firm fixed effects, we are essentially comparing the 
average firm value before versus after a change in staggered boards, controlling for all the other firm 
characteristics and with year fixed effects included as well. 
Table 4 presents our results with firm fixed effects (replicating Table 3 but substituting industry fixed 
effects with firm fixed effects). In contrast to the cross-sectional models, Table 4 shows a positive, statistically 
significant positive association between Staggered Board[t-1] and Q[t]. The economic magnitude of this positive 
association is also significant. In Column (1), for example, the adoption of a staggered board is associated 
with an increase in Q[t] of 3.7% (= 0.059/1.581). The coefficient estimate of the staggered board in Column 
(1) is significant when clustering standard errors at the firm level, with a t-statistic of 2.11.14 
Next, in Column (5), using the period and controls in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), the estimated 
coefficient of Staggered Board[t-1] is also positive and statistically significant at 10% confidence when clustering 
at the firm level. Economically, Column (5) presents even stronger significance, with the adoption of a 
staggered board being associated with a 7.2% increase in Q[t] (= 0.119/1.644).  
Across different sub-sample periods, we naturally find weaker results in periods where there are few 
changes in staggered boards. This is particularly the case of Column (3), which presents results for the time 
period 1990-2000 and where the Staggered Board[t-1] coefficient is insignificant. This should not be surprising, as 

14 For robustness, as with our cross-sectional analysis of staggered boards (see Section 4.1.1. above), in the Online 
Appendix Table A.1 we also control the regressions of Table 4, column (1) for the extended set of controls used in 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005). Specifically, in column (3) of Table A.1 we employ all the controls of the extended set except 
Insider Ownership [t-1] (and Insider Ownership2 [t-1]), while in column (4) of Table A.1 we employ all the controls including Insider 
Ownership [t-1] (and Insider Ownership2 [t-1]). For both columns, the positive coefficient estimate of the association between 
Q[t] and Staggered Board[t-1]  persists and remains statistically significant. 
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the cohort analysis reported in Figure 2 above indicated very little variation in staggering-up (down) activity 
during the 1990s. 
We further investigate the time series dimension of the association between firm value and staggered 
boards by regressing changes in firm value (as measured by Q[t]) on changes in Staggered Board[t-1]. We calculate 
the change in firm value both excluding (in Panel A of Table 5) and including (in Panel B of Table 5) the time 
period during which investors would likely have learned about the change in board structured. For example, 
say a firm has a staggered board at the end of fiscal year 2008 but not at the end of fiscal year 2009. That 
means that the board structure change in this example occurred somewhere during the fiscal year 2009. 
Therefore, we assume that investors learned about that change (as well as approved it) sometime over this 12-
month period. We do not try to get the timing exactly right, e.g., we do not consider an event study around 
the time the proxy gets released or is voted on, as there may be many other confounding issues happening 
during those same events. Rather, we consider the change in the firm value at either the end of the fiscal year 
after the change (in the example, the end of fiscal year 2009; results in Panel A of Table 5) or at the end of the 
fiscal year 12-months before the change (in the example, the end of fiscal year 2008; results in Panel B of 
Table 5), to the firm value 1, 2, 3, 4, up to 5 years later.  
We regress those changes in firm value on the change in the staggered board status, in addition to the 
changes in the main controls. By examining a span of five years, we are able to study the long-term 
association of staggering decisions and firm value. Comparing how the change in value differs across time 
horizons is interesting, as it can show over what time period the average effects documented in Table 4 occur.   
Panel A of Table 5 confirms that firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q[t], increases following the adoption 
of a staggered board and decreases following a decision to de-stagger. Comparing the coefficient on the 
change in the staggered board across the five columns shows that the increase (decrease) in firm value after 
staggering up (down) occurs gradually in the first three years, rather than all in the first year. This suggests 
that market participants need some time to learn about the changed prospects of the firm that occur in the 
period following the change in board structure. The results in Column (1) of Panel B of Table 5 further show 
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that during the “transition year” (in which stock market participants are likely to first learn and then approve 
of the board change) staggering up (down) is positively (negatively) associated with firm value.  
The coefficients in both panels of Table 5 suggest that the positive time series association between 
staggered boards and firm value has an even stronger economic magnitude than that reported in Table 4. For 
example, in Column (3) of Panel A of Table 5, the adoption of a staggered board is associated with an 
increase in Q over the next three years of 7.8% (= 0.123/1.581), about double the magnitude found in the 
Column (1) of Table 4. We can reconcile these magnitudes as follows. First, when we use firm fixed effects in 
Table 4, we are effectively comparing the average level of Q after the change to the average level of Q before 
the change, i.e., we are estimating an average effect before-versus-after. In Table 5, we are comparing the 
changes in the following years to only the level of Q just before the change. Second, and more importantly, in 
Table 4 we control for many firm characteristics that absorb a lot of variation in Q, such as the level of 
profitability (ROA) and R&D expenditures (R&D / Sales). In Table 5, instead, we do not control for changes 
in profitability after the change in board structure. 
Table 5 also employs standard errors that are clustered at the firm level to correct for the autocorrelation 
in the dependent variable. As robustness, we also verify that our results are unchanged when we use the 
Newey-West estimator with up to six lags.15  
4.1.3. Portfolio Analysis 
So far, our time series analysis reveals that there is a statistically significant and economically meaningful 
positive time series relationship between staggered boards and Q[t]. However, investors are unable to trade on 
Q[t]. It is therefore of interest to verify whether the increase in Tobin’s Q after adopting a staggered board is 
reflected in different stock prices (and vice versa as firms stagger down). To this end, following prior 
corporate governance studies (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; and 

15 Lastly, for robustness, similarly to what we did for both our cross-sectional regressions and fixed effects regressions 
(appearing in Table 3 and 4, respectively), in the Online Appendix Table A.2, we replicate the analysis of Table 5, Panel 
A and B using the extended set of controls employed in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005).  Specifically, in the odd columns of 
Panel A and B of Table A.2, we employ all the controls of the extended set except Insider Ownership [t-1] (and Insider 
Ownership2 [t-1]), while in the even columns we employ all the controls including Insider Ownership [t-1] (and Insider Ownership2 [t-
1]). Results are robust.
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Cremers and Ferrell, 2013b)), in Table 6 we study monthly portfolio returns. None of the portfolios we 
construct are tradable, in the sense that for none of the portfolios we are using only information for portfolio 
constructions that would have been publicly available at that time. Rather, our stock return analysis is a 
robustness check for our Q results. 
We proceed by first constructing a portfolio that buys stock of firms around the time that they stagger 
up (the “long” portfolio) and another portfolio that buys stock of firms around the time that they de-stagger 
(the “short” portfolio). We then study the monthly excess returns (i.e., alpha) for these long and short 
portfolios. We consider three different ways to decide when exactly and how long to hold stock of firms 
surrounding changes in staggered board status. First (“6m12”), we include all stocks of firms that have (de-
)staggered their boards starting 6 months before the fiscal year-end date of the year in which the firm has 
reported its board being (de-)staggered for the first time, and hold these stocks for 12 months. Second 
(“12m12”), we include all stocks of firms that have (de-)staggered their boards starting 12 months before the 
fiscal year-end date of the year in which the firm has reported its board being (de-)staggered for the first time, 
and again hold these stocks for 12 months. Third (“12m24”), we include all stocks of firms that have (de-
)staggered their boards starting 12 months before the fiscal year-end date of the year in which the firm has 
reported its board being (de-)staggered for the first time, and hold these stocks for 24 months afterwards. 
Both “12m12” and “12m24” most likely include the period in which shareholders first learned about the 
proposed change and voted to approve the change. For “6m12”, in many cases the changes in board 
structure will already be public knowledge at the time of portfolio construction. 
We present results for excess returns based on three different pricing models: (i) the four factor Carhart 
(1997) model (i.e., we include the pricing factors of Momentum, HML, SMB, and market return), obtaining 
the monthly factor returns from the website of Ken French; (ii) the three-factor Fama-French model (i.e., 
HML, SMB, and market return), and (iii) the market model (i.e., only including the market return as in the 
CAPM). For each model, we present the returns to the long portfolio, short portfolio, and long minus short 
portfolio.  
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Following Fama and French (2008), in Panel A of Table 6, we show equally weighted (EW) excess 
returns, while in Panel B of Table 6, we show value weighted (VW) excess returns. We construct the VW 
long-short portfolios following the same procedure we use for constructing the EW portfolios, which we 
have described above. As weighting factor for the stock returns, we use a firm’s stock average market 
capitalization during the six months preceding the fiscal year-end date of the year in which the firm has 
reported its board being (de-)staggered for the first time. For example, if the event date is December 31st 
2001, we retrieve the average monthly market cap from June 2001 to November 2001. We calculate the 
market capitalization as the product of the outstanding shares and the share price on the closing trading day 
for each month, at the end of the calendar month during the six months preceding the staggering up (down) 
event date. Since the results we obtain for the EW long-short portfolios in Panel A are similar to those for the 
VW long-short portfolio in Panel B, to save space we limit the ensuing discussion to the former set of results. 
As shown by Panel A of Table 6 using the four factor model, the monthly alpha to the long “6m12” 
portfolio is statistically significant at nearly 52 basis points. In contrast, the short portfolio return is not 
statistically significant at 6.2 basis points per month. The results are similar if we employ either the three- 
factor Fama-French model or the CAPM to estimate excess monthly returns to this portfolio. We observe a 
similar magnitude to the “12m12” portfolios, with nearly 53 basis points monthly alpha for the long portfolio 
(although not statistically significant), but in this case we also find a negative monthly alpha of nearly 62 basis 
points to the short portfolio. Combined together, the long minus short “12m12” portfolio has a monthly 
alpha of 1.24%, which is statistically significant.16 Presented annually, the monthly excess return to the long 
minus short portfolio corresponds to nearly 16% annual excess return. Finally, we obtain analogous results 
for the “12m24” portfolio, under all three of the pricing models considered. Hence, the overall results of our 
portfolio analysis are consistent with our time series results, implying that adopting a staggered board 
increases both firm value and shareholder value, while de-staggering is not robustly associated with abnormal 
stock returns.  

16 The returns on the long-short portfolio are not the same as the difference between the returns on the long and short 
portfolios. This is because when calculating the return on the long-short portfolio, we only use those months for which 
both the long and the short portfolio are not empty. 
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While the stock returns have generally weak statistical significance (which may be due to the generally 
low number of stocks included in the portfolios), the economic magnitudes in Table 6 are generally consistent 
with earlier estimates. For example, in Panel A of Table 6, the EW long-short portfolio that buys (sells) stock 
of firms staggering up (down) surrounding the 24-month period around these changes in board structure 
generates an annual four-factor alpha of 5.15% (t-statistic of 1.44). That is quite similar to the economic 
magnitude associated with a change in staggered board for the 2-year change in Tobin’s Q of 5.4% 
(=0.085/1.581) shown in Column 2 of Panel B of Table 5. 
4.1.4. Reverse Causality 
Our time series dimension and portfolio analyses suggest that the negative correlation identified in prior 
cross-sectional studies of the association of staggered boards with firm value might be due to reverse 
causality. In particular, if having a relatively low firm value induces some firms to adopt a staggered board 
(rather than a staggered board causing a low firm value), this could explain the cross-sectional result that firms 
with staggered boards tend to have low firm values. However, reverse causality cannot explain the time series 
results, as firm value tends to go up after the adoption of a staggered board. Neither can it explain the 
(statistically weak) portfolio analysis results, as a portfolio that is long in stocks of firms that have staggered 
up (the “long” portfolio) and short in stocks of firms that have de-staggered (the “short” portfolio) earns 
positive abnormal returns (both under equally-weighted portfolio analysis and value-weighted portfolio 
analysis). 
 To investigate this reverse causality hypothesis between Staggered Boards and Q[t], we employ two 
different approaches. First, we consider whether staggering and de-staggering decisions are related to pre-
existing firm value. Second, we investigate the cross-sectional analysis controlling for lagged firm value.  
Panel A (B) of Table 7 presents reverse causality regressions to explain the adoption (removal) of a 
staggered board. Our sample for Panel A (B) includes all firms that do not (do) have a staggered board up 
until and including the year in which they adopt (remove) a staggered board. Whenever a change in staggering 
(de-staggering) occurs in a firm, that firm is dropped from the sample two years after such a change. Each 
panel shows two different non-linear specifications: a random effects probit model and the Cox proportional 
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hazard model where the change in board structure is the “failure” event. 17 As everywhere else in the paper, 
we cluster the robust standard errors by firm. As shown by Column 2 in Panel A of Table 7, presenting 
results for the Cox model, a standard deviation increase in firm value is associated with a decrease of 57.8% 
in the probability of staggering up (with a t-statistics of 7.63). Similar results are obtained through the probit 
model (see Column 1), where a standard deviation increase in the value of Q[t-1] is associated with a 29.3% 
reduction in the probability of staggering up (with a t-statistic of 3.76).18  
The results in Panel A of Table 7 suggest that the choice of staggering up is partly endogenous and 
motivated by a low firm value. Indeed, firms with high value may not need a staggered board because the risk 
of an opportunistic change of control or short-termist shareholder interference may be much lower for these 
firms. Concerning de-staggering decisions, Panel B of Table 7 shows that both specifications produce 
insignificant results. This indicates that firm value does not reliably predict staggering down.  
As our second approach to investigate reverse causality, we add the one-year lagged Q[t] as an additional 
control to the pooled panel regressions with industry (but not firm) fixed effects regressions of Table 3. If 
reverse causality affects the cross-sectional results, we would expect the identified negative impact to become 
considerably weaker once we control for lagged firm value. This is confirmed in Table 8. In all specifications, 
the coefficient estimate of Staggered Board[t-1] is insignificant once we control for lagged firm value. In addition, 
the coefficient magnitudes are significantly reduced relative to those in Table 3.19 We thus conclude that the 
cross-sectional results seem likely driven by reverse causality.  
4.2. A Positive Account of Staggered Boards 
Our time series results challenge the managerial entrenchment view of staggered boards, i.e. the view 
that sees staggering up decisions as a way to inefficiently isolate boards of directors from market discipline.  

17 See Greene (2004) on the efficiency of the random effects probit model estimator vs. the probit model fixed effects 
estimator. 
ͳͺAgain, for robustness, in the Online Appendix Table A.3, we control the results of both the probit model and Cox 
model for the extended set of controls used in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005).  Specifically, in Column (1) of  Table A.3, we 
employ all the controls of the extended set except Insider Ownership [t-1] (and Insider Ownership2 [t-1]), while in Column (2) of 
Table A.3, we employ all the controls including Insider Ownership [t-1] (and Insider Ownership2 [t-1]). In Column (3) and (4), we 
replicate the same additional controls for the Cox model. In each of the four columns, our results remain robust.  
19 As shown in Column (6) of the Online Appendix Table A.1, our results on the one-year lagged Q[t] are confirmed 
when we include the extended set of controls employed by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005). 
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In particular, our main new finding that staggering up is associated with increased firm value casts a doubt on 
the claim that board insulation encourages value-decreasing, self-serving behaviors by incumbents.   
In this section, we explore an alternative, positive account of staggered boards. In particular, we propose 
a hypothesis based on potential incentive problems in the shareholder-manager relationship. Under this 
hypothesis, staggered boards emerge in context of asymmetric information (or noisy market prices) as a 
response to the difficulty of firm insiders to share information about the firm’s prospects when the firm has 
relatively low value. This is especially likely to be the case in firms with long-term, specific investments, which 
tend to be accompanied by high operational complexity. Indeed, shareholders may lack the incentives or the 
resources to investigate whether low short-term firm value is attributable to poor managerial performance or 
commitment to long-term projects that only decrease short-term (but not long-term) earnings. Anticipating 
that low firm value may lead to removal from the board, directors may adopt a myopic, short-termism 
perspective in order to appease shareholders. On this view, the adoption of a staggered board could help 
make directors less susceptible to myopic incentives and encourage a longer-term commitment to firm value 
creation.  
To test this hypothesis, in the following sections we revisit out time series analysis results by 
conditioning the effect of Staggered Board[t-1] on Q[t] on various firm-level features that relate to a firm’s 
investment policy and operational complexity, board and governance features, and executive compensation 
incentives.  
4.2.1. Staggered Boards, Investments, and Operational Complexity  
We first consider the main conjecture in our positive account of staggered boards, namely whether the 
time series positive association between staggering up and firm value is stronger for firms that have more 
long-term, specific investments and higher operational complexity. As variables of interest, we consider 
R&D/ Sales[t], Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t], Ranked Patent Citation Count[t], and Firm Size[t] (all defined in Table 
1). Our positive account of staggered boards would suggest that the positive association between staggering 
up and increased firm value is stronger for firms with (i) higher R&D expenses as a fractions of their 
revenues; (ii) more intangible assets; (iii) more patent citation counts (as a proxy for innovation, following 
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Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001); and (iv) larger size (as a measure of complexity, following Faleye, 2007; 
and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999).  
Table 9 shows the results of our interaction analysis. The odd columns present the interaction impact on 
Q[t] of Staggered Board[t-1] and the above variables of interests,20 while the even columns only consider the direct 
effect of such variables on Q[t] and do not include the interaction. The results in Table 9 strongly support our 
conjectures. 
For example, the interaction of R&D/Sales[t-1] (see column 1) has a positive and both statistically and 
economically significant coefficient. Firms whose R&D/Sales[t-1] is one standard deviation higher than the 
mean (i.e., “high R&D” firms) experience a 10.8% higher level of Q[t]  after staggering up relative to firms 
whose R&D/Sales[t-1] is at the mean.21 Remarkably, as compared to the direct economic effect of Staggered 
Board[t-1], the economic effect of Staggered Board[t-1] for high R&D firms is twice as high.22   
Similarly, we find that firms with Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t-1] that are one standard deviation higher 
than the mean present a 3.96% higher Q[t] if they stagger up relative to firms with average intangible assets.  
Consistently, firms that have one standard deviation higher Ranked Patent Citation Count[t-1] have a 4.97% 
higher Q[t] if they stagger up compared to firms with mean (i.e., very low) patent counts. 
These findings supports our hypothesis that staggered boards are especially beneficial in firms whose 
investment programs or assets require time and thus longer-term ex ante commitment to be optimally 
developed. These findings also appear consistent with the literature documenting that investors regularly 
underestimate the benefits of R&D investments in the short-term (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001; 
Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique, 2004) and may even exert pressure to reduce such investments in order to 
boost short-term earnings (Bushee, 1998). Viewed through this lens, the adoption of a staggered board would 
provide a means to address inefficiencies that can arise in contexts where the innovative and/or firm-specific 

20 All the continuous variables in the interaction terms (i.e., R&D/ Sales[t], Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t], and Firm Size[t]) 
are demeaned prior to calculating the interaction. 
21  We obtain this estimation by multiplying the coefficient of the interacting variable (i.e., 1.962) by the standard 
deviation of R&D/Sales[t], divided by the average Q[t] in the sample of observations used to estimate Column (1). 
22 The economic effect of Staggered Board[t-1] on Q[t] for all firms in Column (1) is a 4.49% increase of Q[t], calculated as the 
ratio of the coefficient estimate of 0.076 on Staggered Board[t-1] divided by the average Q[t-1]. 
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nature of a firm’s investments makes it more likely that asymmetric information may distort the relationship 
with the firm’s investors. 
Turning to complexity, firms whose Firm Size[t] is one standard deviation higher than the average tend to 
have a 3.4% higher Q[t] if they stagger up relative to firms with average size. Based on the premise that larger 
firms are inherently more complex than smaller ones (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Faleye, 2007), this result 
suggests that directors who do not have to stand annual (re)elections are in a better position to manage firms 
with a high level of operational complexity, most likely because the oversight of large, complex firms tends to 
involve a long-term outlook that is incompatible with frequent shareholder interference and the potential for 
myopic director incentives that can arise therefrom.23 
4.2.2. Staggered Boards and Corporate Governance  
An alternative explanation for the positive association between staggering up and firm value is that firms 
that stagger up may simultaneously decrease other entrenching governance mechanisms. Similarly, the 
decision to adopt a staggered board may be primarily taken by firms whose other corporate mechanisms 
provide strong safeguards against managerial entrenchment. To verify this alternative explanation, we interact 
Staggered Board[t-1] with two proxies for managerial entrenchment: CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t-1], and the G-
index[t-1] (all defined in Table 1) in pooled panel Q regressions with firm and year fixed effects.  
CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t] refers to the duality of the CEO and board chairman roles. CEOs who 
also chair the board of directors seem better positioned to opportunistically dominate the board (Brickley, 
Coles, and Jarrell, 1997). Alternatively, CEO-duality may be a consequence of well-performing CEOs being 
rewarded. Under this hypothesis, CEO duality is therefore a proxy for the firm being managed effectively 
(Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). The other proxy that we use is the G-index[t-1] of Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003), which is a standard proxy of limitations to shareholder rights, as explained in Section 3 above. 
Similar to Table 9, we show the impact of the interacted variables on Q[t] in odd columns.  

23 As shown in the Online Appendix Table A.4, our results on the interactions with R&D/ Sales[t], Intangible Assets/ Total 
Assets[t], Ranked Patent Citation Count[t], and Firm Size[t] are confirmed when we include the extended set of controls 
employed by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005).  
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The interaction of CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t-1]  with the staggered board dummy (in Column (1)) is 
positive and significant. Hence, firms with dual CEO-board chairman experience a larger increase in value if 
they stagger up relative to firms whose CEO does not also chair the board.  A possible explanation, which is 
also consistent with the hypothesis of Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), is that managing longer-term 
projects (i.e., one potential reason to stagger up) is relatively complex and thus better accomplished by 
talented CEOs, who have earned the privilege of chairing the board of directors. As shown in Column (2), 
the coefficient on CEO-chair duality by itself is positive, such that the firm value tends to go up (down) if the 
CEO starts (leaves) as chair of the board. However, the coefficient on the CEO-chair duality dummy 
becomes insignificant once its interaction with a staggered board is included in Column (1). Therefore, 
changes in CEO-chair duality are only related to changes in firm value for firms with a staggered board.  
The coefficient of the interactions of G-index[t-1] (in Column (3)) is insignificant. This suggests that the 
positive impact of staggering up on firm value cannot be explained by the simultaneous decrease of other 
entrenching mechanisms. In other words, we find that the change in firm value before versus after the 
adoption / removal of a staggered board is independent of the level of shareholder rights at the firm. 
However, consistent with Cremers and Ferrell (2013), the non-interacted effect of G-index[t-1] on firm value (in 
Columns (3) and (4)) remains negative and significant even if firm fixed effects are included.24  
4.2.3. Staggered Boards and Executive Compensation 
In this subsection we consider whether the positive (negative) association between the adoption 
(removal) of a staggered board and firm value is related to strong equity-based incentives that guard against 
managerial entrenchment. As proxies of such incentives, we include CEO Delta[t] and CEO Vega[t]. In testing 
the impact of the interaction of Staggered Board[t-1] and these variables on Q[t], our positive account of staggered 
boards would suggest that firms with a staggered board are better able to provide incentives for effective, 
long-term managerial risk-taking. Therefore, we conjecture that stronger CEO incentives will be more 
positively associated with increases in firm value if the firm staggers up. Put differently, if staggering up is 

24 As shown in the Online Appendix Table A.5, our results on the interactions with CEO Turnover[t-1], CEO-Board 
Chairman Duality[t-1], and the G-index[t-1] are confirmed when we include the extended set of controls employed by 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005). 
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partly done because of the need for a longer-term outlook on the board, then strong risk-taking incentives for 
the CEO may become more productive after the board staggers up (and vice versa if the board de-staggers). 
Table 11 shows our results. For CEO Delta[t-1], we find that the interacted coefficient is insignificant 
while CEO Delta[t] by itself is positive and highly significant. This suggests that increases in pay-for-
performance are positively related to changes in firm value, but similarly for firms with and without a 
staggered board.  However, the interaction between a staggered board and CEO Vega is strongly and 
positively related to the firm value.  Specifically, firms with CEO Vega[t-1] that is one standard deviation above 
the mean have an increase in firm value that is 5.53% higher if they stagger up relative to firms with average 
CEO Vega.  
These result confirm our conjecture that staggering up is complementary to strong risk-taking incentives, 
especially incentives to increase the long-run riskiness of the firm’s cash flows (which seems better measured 
by CEO Vega than CEO Delta).  
Finally, we also investigate the interaction of Staggered Board [t-1] with CEO Total Compensation[t], to consider 
the view that high executive compensation itself is evidence of managerial entrenchment and more so in the 
presence of a staggered board. Our results are not consistent with this view. Rather, when we add the 
interaction of the adoption of a staggered board with the level of total CEO compensation to firm value 
regressions, this interaction has a strongly positive impact on firm value. Economically, firm with CEO Total 
Compensation[t] that is one standard deviation above the mean have an increase in firm value that is 5.43% 
higher if they stagger up relative to firms with average total CEO compensation. Consistent with the 
interpretation of the findings of Gabaix and Landier (2008), namely that more skilled managers manage large 
firms that pay them more, this result suggests that staggered boards may be more valuable at firms with a 
high-pay CEO, potentially because these CEOs are particularly talented at the challenging task of running 
complex, large organizations with a long-term outlook.25 Nota come sopra, Appendix Table 6. 

ʹͷAs shown in the Online Appendix Table A.6, our results on the interactions with CEO Delta[t], CEO Vega[t], and CEO 
Total Compensation[t], are confirmed when we include the extended set of controls employed by Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005). 
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5.  Robustness Analysis 
Our robustness analysis addresses two concerns. First, as previously noted, for most of our analysis we 
use a basic set of control variables including Ln (Assets)[t-1], Delaware Incorporation[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], 
and R&D/ Sales[t-1]. This empirical strategy is motivated by the fact that including the extended set of control 
variables appearing in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) comes at the cost of a significantly reduced sample size. To 
give a tangible example, including the extended set of controls in Column (1) of Table 4 would reduce the 
sample size from 31,574 observations to 14,376 observations. For robustness, we check whether including 
the extended set of controls changes our results qualitatively. We present these results in the Online 
Appendix to save space. To this end, we add to all the regressions presented in Tables 3 through 5 and in 
Tables 7 through 11 the following controls: G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Insider Ownership[t-1], 
and Insider Ownership2[t-1].26   
We find that our results are preserved when we use the extended set of controls. More specifically, in 
almost every specification the coefficient estimate of the staggered board dummy becomes economically 
stronger. For example, when we add the additional variables to the specification in Column (1) of Table 4, we 
find that the Staggered Board[t-1] coefficient increases to 0.115 with an associated t-statistic of 2.64, compared to 
a coefficient of 0.059 and a t-statistic of 2.11 in Table 4. 
Second, because of the persistence of the dependent variable over time, a possible concern is that some 
of the coefficients presented in the first difference analysis (Table 5) could be inflated by the autocorrelation 
in the residuals. For example, the dependent variable of ¨Q[t,t+5] is highly correlated with its value at time t-1 
(i.e., ¨Q[t-1,t+4]), which could create autocorrelation in residuals and therefore cause biased coefficient 
estimates. To address this concern, we verify that these results are robust to controlling for either ¨Q[t-1,t] or 
Q[t-1] in Panel A (¨Q[t-2,t-1] or Q[t-2] in Panel B). These additional tests confirm our findings that the relationship 
between ¨Q[t,t+1] and ¨Staggered Board[t-1,t] is positive and statistically significant.  
 

26 In particular Insider Ownership[t-1] reduces sample size the most. For example, in Table 4, Column (1), including the 
extended set of controls but Insider Ownership[t-1] (and Insider Ownership2[t-1]) increases the sample size from 14,376 
observations to 19,743 observation. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have revisited the common view in corporate governance that adopting a staggered 
board lowers firm value and that it is generally preferable to de-stagger. Using a comprehensive data on 
staggered boards in 1978-2011 for a panel of U.S. firms, we find that the negative cross-sectional association 
between staggered boards and firm value is reversed in the time series analysis. 
 These surprising results are very robust. Using both pooled panel Tobin’s Q regressions with firm fixed 
effects and first differences regressions of changes in Tobin’s Q and changes in whether the firm has a 
staggered board, we find that firm value goes up upon the adoption of a staggered board and goes down 
upon removal of a staggered board. In particular, using firm fixed effect regressions, we find that staggering 
up (down) is associated with an increase (decrease) in Tobin’s Q of about 6.3%. We further corroborate these 
results using stock returns of portfolios holding stocks of firms around the time the firm staggers up or 
staggers down, and find that stocks that stagger up tend to have positive abnormal returns around the time 
they adopt a staggered board. In contrast, stocks that de-stagger tend to have no or negative abnormal 
returns. 
These results challenge the common understanding that staggered boards are primarily a mechanism to 
help entrench management from the discipline of stockholders or the market of corporate control. In 
addition, they question the guidelines of the shareholder voting (proxy) advisors that generally recommend to 
vote against the adoption of a staggered board and, likewise, in favor of the removal of a staggered board 
(ISS, 2013; Glass Lewis, 2013). For example, the proxy guidelines for the 2013 season of Glass Lewis (i.e., 
one of the two most prominent proxy advisors in the world, the other being the ISS) state that they “favor 
the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less 
accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of 
directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.” 
How can we interpret our evidence that the adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase 
in firm value? We first try to reconcile the seemingly conflicting existing cross-sectional evidence with our 
new time series evidence. We find that the cross-sectional results in this and in prior studies – that in the 
cross-section, staggered boards tend to have a lower value – could be explained by the reverse causality 
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embedded in the choice of adopting a staggered board. In particular, our evidence suggests that firms with 
low firm value are more likely to adopt a staggered board. 
Second, we propose a positive account of staggered boards, in which staggering up may be efficiently 
employed by some firms to mitigate the risk of interference by shareholders with a short-term investment 
horizon and/or the risk of takeovers from opportunistic raiders. While short-term pressure from stockowners 
may generally provide an efficient mechanism to discipline management and the board, in the specific context 
of high asymmetric information (or very noisy market prices) such market discipline may have adverse 
consequences. For example, it may be very difficult for firm insiders to credibly signal to investors that 
decreased short-term earnings are due to significant long-term and profitable investment programs rather 
than to poor managerial performance. In addition, investors with short-term investment horizons may have 
poor incentives to expend considerable resources to address such information problems, especially for large, 
complex firms. In particular, Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner (2013) document that the average institutional 
holding duration (i.e., the average length of time a stock is held in an institutional portfolio) is about 1.5 years 
with about 40% of holdings having a duration below 1 year, which seem well below the typical time horizons 
over which the uncertain prospects of large capital expenditures are revealed. 
In this context, the board is likely to be better informed than outside shareholders. As a result, short-
term shareholder pressure may potentially induce managerial myopia and overinvestment in short-term 
projects at the expense of value-enhancing long-term ones. A staggered board may therefore be beneficial to 
insulate the board from such shareholder pressure and promote longer-term commitment to value creation. 
Consistent with this conjecture, we find that adopting a staggered board has a more positive effect on firm 
value for firms where such shareholder-manager problems may be more important, such as firms with higher 
R&D, more intangible assets, more innovative research, and firms that are larger and thus more complex. 
From a broader perspective, these results cast a doubt on recent academic and regulatory proposals in 
favor of shareholder empowerment, suggesting that in corporate contexts where asymmetric information and 
long-term investments play a crucial role (as they do in many modern large firms), shareholders interference 
risks being detrimental rather than beneficial.  To the best of our knowledge, we are also the first to challenge 
the claim (see, e.g., Bebchuk, 2013), that the empirical evidence decidedly supports the adoption of a 
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shareholder-driven corporate governance model. In contrast to this claim, our results seem to suggest that the 
traditional director primacy model as enforced by the courts of Delaware (i.e., vesting the authority to run the 
corporation on the board of directors and reserving to shareholders only a secondary role) can efficiently 
serve the interests of shareholders and society as whole.  
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FIGURE 1:  
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS WITH A STAGGERED BOARD 
 
The chart below shows the percentage of firms with a staggered board in our sample, each year from 1978 – 
2011. Excluded from the sample are stocks that have dual class shares. 
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FIGURE 2:  
COHORT ANALYSIS FOR STAGGERING UP AND DE-STAGGERING 
 
Figure 2 documents the percentage of firms with a staggered board each year for six cohorts of firms: (i) 
firms with a staggered board in 1978 (“SB in 1978”), (ii) firms without a staggered board in 1978 (“ No SB in 
1978”); (iii) firms with a staggered board in 1990 (“SB in 1990”), (iv) firms without a staggered board in 1990 
(“ No SB in 1990”), (v) firms with a staggered board in 2000 (“SB in 2000”), and lastly (vi) firms without a 
staggered board in 2000 (“ No SB in 2000”). The figure shows the annual percentage with a staggered board 
within each cohort, as a percentage of those firms that remain in our sample that year.  
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TABLE 1: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
 
Table 1 presents brief definitions of the main variables that appear in the analysis. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at one percent in both tails. 
 
Dependent Variables:   
Monthly Returns on long (short) portfolio 
“6m12” 
 
 
 
Defined as the monthly return of a portfolio created by stocks that 
stagger up (down) their boards. Portfolio is created by including all 
stocks of firms that have (de)staggered their board for 12 months, 
starting 6 months before the fiscal year-end date of the year in which 
the company has reported its board being (de-)staggered for the first 
time. Returns are either equally or value weighted. 
Monthly Returns on long (short) portfolio 
“12m12” 
 
Defined as a long (short) portfolio created by including all stocks of 
firms that have (de)staggered their board for 12 months, starting 12 
months before the fiscal year-end date of the year in which the 
company has reported its board being (de-)staggered.  
Monthly Returns on long (short) portfolio 
“12m24” 
 
Defined as a long (short) portfolio created by including all stocks of 
firms that have (de)staggered their board for 24 months, starting 12 
months before the fiscal year-end date of the year in which the 
company has reported its board being (de-)staggered.  
Tobin's Q 
Defined as the Market value of assets (i.e., Total Assets – Book 
Equity + Market Equity) divided by the book value of assets. 
Calculation follows Fama and French (1992). Source of data is 
Compustat annual data file.  
Independent Variables:   
CAPX/ Assets[t] Capital Expenditure[t]/ Total Assets[t]. 
Delaware Incorporation[t] 
Indicator variable if the company is incorporated in Delaware in year 
t.  
G-Index (minus staggered board)[t] 
Sum of 23 (i.e., 24 excluding staggered board) governance provisions 
indicators in the corporate charter or bylaws introduced by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
Insider Ownership[t] 
The insider ownership in year t is the percentage of shares owned by 
insiders from all shares. Collected from Compact Disclosure for 
1986-2006. We supplement these data with the ownership by the top 
management team from ExecuComp for 2007-2011. From 
ExecuComp, we use the total shares owned by the top five officers 
of the firm. 
Ln (Age) [t] 
 
Natural logarithm of firm age. The age is calculated as the difference 
in year t and the first year the company appeared in the CRSP 
database. 
Ln (Assets) [t] Natural logarithm of total book assets in year t. 
R&D/ Sales[t] R&D[t]/ Sales[t]. 
ROA[t] EBITDA[t]/Total Assets[t]. 
Staggered Board[t] Indicator variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if the board is 
staggered in year t. Data are obtain from Cremers and Ferrell (2013) 
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for 1978-1989, and from Risk Metrics, SharkRepellent.net and hand 
collection for 1990-2011.  

Interacted Variables:   
CEO Delta[t] 
Percent change in the value of the Chief Executive Officer (i.e., 
CEO) option portfolio in year t for a one percent increase in stock 
price. We calculate it following Core and Guay (2002). Data are 
available from ExecuComp for 1992-2010. 
CEO Total Compensation[t] 
CEO’s Total Compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual + 
Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of 
Option Grants). The source of the data is the variable TDC1 in 
ExecuComp data file. Available for 1992-2011. 
CEO Vega[t] 
Percent change in the value of the CEO option portfolio for a one 
percent increase in the volatility of the returns on the underlying 
stock. We calculate it following Core and Guay (2002). Data are 
available from ExecuComp for 1992-2010. 
CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t] 
Indicator variable equal to one if the chairman of the board is also 
the CEO in year t. Source of the data is BoardEx data file and Risk 
Metrics (formerly IRRC) data file for 1996-2011. 
Firm Size[t] Ln (Sales) in year t. 
Governance Index[t] Defined above. Source is Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t] (Total Assets[t] - Net PP&E[t])/ Total Assets[t]. 
R&D/ Sales[t] Defined above. Source is Compustat. 
Ranked Patent Citation Count[t] 
Annually ranked patent citation count. Data are available for 1978-
2003. Citations are calculated following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2001). Source is the NBER U.S. Patent Citations data file.   
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MAIN DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. 
 
Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics for the main dependent and independent variables as well as  
the interacted variables. 
 
Dependent Variables: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
      
Q [t] 1.581 1.282 0.867 0.725 4.660 31,574 
¨ Q[t, t+1]  -0.011 0.006 0.500 -5.298 4.734 28,464 
¨ Q[t, t+2]  -0.018 0.007 0.638 -5.502 4.941 26,310 
¨ Q[t, t+3]  -0.019 0.012 0.722 -5.500 4.862 24,273 
¨ Q[t, t+4]  -0.017 0.013 0.771 -5.134 4.895 22,350 
¨ Q[t, t+5]  -0.035 0.004 0.812 -5.427 4.907 20,558 

Independent Variables:  Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
CAPX/ Assets[t] 0.06 0.05 0.05 0 0.20 31,574 
Delaware Incorporation[t]  0.55 1 0.50 0 1 31,574 
G-Index (minus staggered board)[t] 7.68 8.00 3.20 1 18.00 23,525 
Insider Ownership[t] 0.07 0.03 0.10 0 1 21,216 
Ln (Age) [t] 2.87 3.00 0.98 0 4.45 27,754 
Ln (Assets) [t] 7.29 7.17 1.56 4.55 11.05 31,574 
R&D/ Sales[t] 0.03 0 0.06 0 0.23 31,574 
ROA[t] 0.14 0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.32 31,574 
Staggered Board[t] 0.53 1 0.50 0 1 31,574 
 
Interacted Variables:27 Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
        
R&D/ Sales[t]  0.003 -0.025 0.0552 -0.025 0.205 31,574 
Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t] -0.039 0.116 0.4665 -1.663 0.448 31,337 
Ranked Patent Citation Count[t]  0.007 -0.023 0.2171 -0.258 0.678 15,338 
Firm Size[t]  0.022 -0.056 1.4713 -3.309 3.739 31,558 
High Complexity[t]  0.023 0 0.1512 0 1 31,574 
        
CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t]  0.577 1 0.4941 0 1 10,356 
G-Index (minus staggered board)[t]  0.103 0.428 3.1986 -6.572 10.428 23,525 
CEO Delta[t]  -0.056 -0.627 1.9854 -0.855 15.284 17,573 
CEO Vega[t]  -0.002 -0.101 0.2725 -0.178 1.485 15,983 
CEO Total Compensation[t]  0.0004 -0.054 0.8762 -2.573 4.439 17,965 
        
 
 
 

27 All continuous variables that are used in interaction analysis are demeaned. Descriptive statistics shown above are for 
the demeaned variables within the samples used in the corresponding regressions. 
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TABLE 3: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS  
 
Table 3 shows a replication of Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) with two different sets of control variables and 
across different time periods. Columns (1)-(4) include the following control variables: Staggered Board[t-1]ǡ Ln 
(Assets)[t-1]ǡ Delaware Incorporation[t-1]ǡ ROA[t-1]ǡ CAPX/Assets[t-1]ǡ and R&D/ Sales[t-1]Ǥ Column (5) adds these 
control variables: G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1]ǡ Insider Ownership[t-1]ǡ and Insider Ownership2[t-1]Ǥ
The analysis includes the following sub-periods: 1978-2011, 1978-1989, 1990-2000, 2001-2011, and 1995-
2002. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions where year and industry fixed effects are always 
included. All control variables are defined in Table 1. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two tailed tests, based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. For the key independent variable—Staggered Board[t-1]— we show two separate standard 
errors: “(.)” reflects robust standard errors clustered at the firm level; “[.]” reflects robust standard errors that 
are not clustered.  
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TABLE 3: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS (CONTINUED) 
 
  
Dep. Variable is  Q[t] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Period: 
1978- 
2011 
1978- 
1989 
1990- 
2000 
2001- 
2011 
1995- 
2002 
      
Staggered Board[t-1] -0.041** -0.009 -0.073** -0.026 -0.045 
(firm cluster) (2.39) (0.51) (2.51) (1.07) (1.26) 
[no cluster] [5.0] [0.96] [4.32] [1.96] [1.96] 
G-Index[t-1] - - - - -0.087** 
     (2.39) 
Ln (G-Index)[t-1] - - - - 0.775** 
     (2.30) 
Ln (Assets)[t-1] -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.006 -0.042*** 0.052*** 
(3.73) (3.33) (0.44) (4.11) (3.25) 
Ln (Firm Age)[t-1] - - - - -0.057 
     (1.52) 
Delaware Incorporation[t-1] 0.014 0.026 0.016 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.77) (1.26) (0.49) (0.30) (0.19) 
Insider Ownership[t-1] - - - - 0.292 
     (0.88) 
Insider Ownership2[t-1] - - - - -0.102 
     (0.21) 
ROA[t-1] 5.076*** 2.70*** 5.86*** 5.304*** 5.925*** 
(32.74) (15.97) (22.76) (24.06) (19.07) 
CAPX/Assets[t-1] -0.263 -0.251 -0.522 0.228 -1.038** 
(1.14) (1.23) (1.22) (0.58) (2.14) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] 4.23*** 4.669*** 6.162*** 3.819*** 5.477*** 
(12.01) (5.19) (10.31) (9.32) (7.15) 
    
N 31,574 8,500 9,617 13,457 5,253 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.50 0.49 0.57 0.49 0.61 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect No No No No No 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of firms in regression 3,023 1,079 1,420 2,116 992 
Clustering Firm Firm  Firm Firm Firm 
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TABLE 4: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS – CONTROLLING FOR FIRM FIXED EFFECTS 
 
Table 4 shows a replication of Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) with two different sets of control variables and 
across different time periods. Columns (1)-(4) include the following control variables: Staggered Board[t-1]ǡ Ln 
(Assets)[t-1]ǡ Delaware Incorporation[t-1]ǡ ROA[t-1]ǡ CAPX/Assets[t-1]ǡ and R&D/ Sales[t-1]Ǥ Column (5) adds these 
control variables: G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1]ǡ Insider Ownership[t-1]ǡ and Insider Ownership2[t-1]Ǥ
The analysis includes the following sub-periods: 1978-2011, 1978-1989, 1990-2000, 2001-2011, and 1995-
2002. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions. We include year and firm fixed effects. All 
control variables are defined in Table 1. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. For the key 
independent variable—Staggered Board[t-1]— we show two separate standard errors: “(.)” reflects robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level; “[.]” reflects robust standard errors that are not clustered.  
 
(Continued on next page) 
 
Dep. Variable is  Q[t] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Period: 
1978- 
2011 
1978- 
1989 
1990- 
2000 
2001- 
2011 
1995- 
2002 
Variables      
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.059** 0.034 0.009 0.083** 0.119* 
(firm cluster) (2.11) (1.26) (0.12) (2.19) (1.81) 
[no cluster] [4.65] [2.35] [0.19] [3.44] [2.13] 
G-Index[t-1] - - - - -0.006 
     (0.15) 
Ln (G-Index)[t-1] - - - - 0.016 
     (0.04) 
Ln (Assets)[t-1] -0.215*** -0.13*** -0.174*** -0.353*** -0.396*** 
 (12.0) (4.56) (4.64) (11.07) (8.10) 
Ln (Firm Age)[t-1] - - - - 0.318 
     (1.53) 
Insider Ownership[t-1] - - - - 0.564 
     (1.27) 
Insider Ownership2[t-1] - - - - -0.746 
     (1.06) 
ROA[t-1] 2.942*** 1.317*** 2.801*** 1.70*** 2.065*** 
 (20.27) (10.51) (11.41) (8.37) (7.72) 
CAPX/Assets[t-1] 0.103 0.133 -0.68** -0.071 -0.916** 
 (0.61) (0.8) (2.33) (0.25) (2.21) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] 1.453*** 2.035 3.283*** 0.561 0.411 
 (2.73) (1.27) (3.43) (0.95) (0.34) 
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(Table 4 continued)     
N 31,574 8,500 9,617 13,457 5,253 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.714 0.697 0.765 0.772 0.796 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of firms in regression 3,023 1,079 1,420 2,116 992 
Clustering Firm Firm  Firm Firm Firm 
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TABLE 5: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS– FIRST DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS. 
 
PANEL A. FUTURE CHANGES IN Q VS. PAST CHANGES IN CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Table 5, Panel A presents pooled panel first difference regressions with the dependent variable being the 
change in Q from t to t+1 in column (1) (i.e., ¨ Q[t, t+1]), the change in Q from t to t+2 in column (2) (i.e., ¨ 
Q[t, t+2]) , the change in Q from t to t+3 in column (3) (i.e., ¨ Q[t, t+3]), the change in Q from t to t+4 in 
column (4) (i.e., ¨ Q[t, t+4]), and the change in Q from t to t+5 in column (5) (i.e., ¨ Q[t, t+5]). As independent 
variables, we include the following: ¨ Staggered Board[t-1,t]ǡ ¨ Ln (Assets)[t-1,t]ǡ ¨ ROA[t-1,t]ǡ ¨ CAPX/Assets[t-1,t]ǡ and 
¨ R&D/ Sales[t-1,t]. Sample period is 1978-2011, but varies per model due to availability of lagged data and is 
reported for each model. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics (in their absolute value) of 
the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of 
the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. All control variables 
are defined in Table 1. Our sample for Column (1) includes 351 cases of staggering up and 307 cases of 
staggering down. The number of firms per regression model is noted in the table.  
 
 
  
Dep. Variables: ¨ Q[t, t+1] ¨ Q[t, t+2] ¨ Q[t, t+3] ¨ Q[t, t+4] ¨ Q[t, t+5] 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
¨ Staggered Board[t-1, t] 0.03* 0.079*** 0.123*** 0.103*** 0.153*** 
(1.89) (2.98) (4.26) (3.0) (4.10) 
¨ Ln(Assets)[t-1, t] -0.311*** -0.546*** -0.592*** -0.607*** -0.625*** 
(14.14) (17.02) (15.74) (15.43) (13.99) 
¨ ROA[t-1, t] -0.34*** -0.857*** -1.271*** -1.55*** -1.588*** 
(3.93) (8.64) (10.74) (11.63) (10.97) 
¨ CAPX/Assets[t-1, t] -0.925*** -0.904*** -1.203*** -1.083*** -1.038*** 
(6.42) (5.17) (6.66) (6.12) (5.26) 
¨ R&D/ Sales[t-1, t] 0.651 0.448 0.168 0.308 -0.519 
 (1.51) (0.87) (0.28) (0.52) (0.68) 
  
Sample Period (years for t) 
1979- 
2011 
1979- 
2010 
1979- 
2009 
1979- 
2008 
1979- 
2007 
# of firms in regression 2,792 2,623 2,480 2,335 2,128 
N 28,328 26,178 24,146 22,225 20,440 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.018 0.031 0.032 0.03 0.028 
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TABLE 5: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS– FIRST DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS. 
 
PANEL B. FUTURE CHANGES IN Q VS. PAST CHANGES IN CONTROL VARIABLES (INCLUDING TRANSITION 
YEAR)  
 
Table 5, Panel B presents pooled panel first difference regressions with the dependent variable being the 
change in Q from t-1 to t in column (1) (i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t]), the change in Q from t-1 to t+1 in column (2) (i.e., ¨ 
Q[t-1, t+1]) , the change in Q from t-1 to t+2 in column (3) (i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t+2]), , the change in Q from t-1 to t+3 in 
column (4) (i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t+3]), and the change in Q from t-1 to t+4 in column (5) (i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t+4]). As 
independent variables, we include the following: ¨ Staggered Board[t-1,t]ǡ ¨ Ln (Assets)[t-1,t]ǡ ¨ ROA[t-1,t]ǡ ¨ 
CAPX/Assets[t-1,t], and ¨ R&D/ Sales[t-1,t]. Sample period is 1978-2011, but it varies per model due to 
availability of lagged data and is reported for each model. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Results are robust to an adjustment to the standard errors for autocorrelation as in Newey-West (where the 
adjustment includes up to sixth lags). T-statistics (in their absolute value) of the regression coefficients are 
shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. All control variables are defined in Table 1. Our 
sample for Column (1) includes 341 cases of staggering up and 272 cases of staggering down. The number of 
firms per regression model is noted in the table.  
 
 
 
  
Der. Variables: ¨ Q[t-1, t] ¨ Q[t-1, t+1] ¨ Q[t-1, t+2] ¨ Q[t-1, t+3] ¨ Q[t-1, t+4] 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
¨ Staggered Board[t-1, t] 0.054*** 0.085*** 0.131*** 0.18*** 0.168*** 
(3.40) (3.76) (4.35) (5.65) (4.39) 
¨ Assets[t-1, t] -0.336*** -0.638*** -0.853*** -0.899*** -0.901*** 
 (12.42) (18.79) (20.61) (20.35) (19.17) 
¨ ROA[t-1, t] 2.281*** 1.996*** 1.562*** 1.183*** 1.167*** 
 (19.93) (14.61) (11.80) (8.56) (7.80) 
¨ CAPX/Assets[t-1, t] -0.355** -1.282*** -1.256*** -1.597*** -1.355*** 
 (2.33) (7.62) (7.25) (8.6) (6.69) 
¨ R&D/ Sales[t-1, t] -0.964** -0.508 -0.60 -0.924 -0.712 
 (2.05) (1.13) (1.05) (1.39) (0.92) 
  
Sample Period (years) 
 
1979- 
2012 
1979- 
2011 
1979- 
2010 
1979- 
2009 
1979- 
2008 
# of firms in regression 2,908 2,788 2,618 2,475 2,329 
N 29,387 28,220 26,077 24,050 22,134 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.061 0.06 0.064 0.059 0.052 
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TABLE 6, PANELS A AND B: PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 
 
Table 6 presents the analysis of monthly portfolio returns for firms that have staggered up (in the ‘long’ 
portfolio) and firms that have de-staggerred (in the ‘short’ portfolio). Presented are the equally weighted 
(value weighted) returns in Panel A (Panel B) for the long portfolio minus the short portfolio around board 
staggering and de-staggering event in our sample of firms during the time period 1978-2011. The long (short) 
portfolios are composed every month as follows. For portfolio “6m12”, we include all stocks of firms that 
have (de-)staggered their boards starting 6 months before the fiscal year-end date of the year in which the 
firm has reported its board being (de-)staggered for the first time, and hold these stocks for 12 months. For 
portfolio “12m12”, we include all stocks of firms that have (de-)staggered their boards starting 12 months 
before the fiscal year-end date of the year in which the firm has reported its board being (de-)staggered for 
the first time, and again hold these stocks for 12 months. For portfolio “12m24”, we include all stocks of 
firms that have (de-)staggered their boards starting 12 months before the fiscal year-end date of the year in 
which the firm has reported its board being (de-)staggered for the first time, and hold these stocks for 24 
months. We use three models: the four factor Carhart (1997) model (i.e., Momentum, HML, SMB, and 
market return), the three factor Fama-French model (i.e., HML, SMB, and market return), and the market 
model (i.e., CAPM). For each model, we present the returns to the (i) long portfolio, (ii) short portfolio, and 
(iii) long minus short portfolio. The absolute values of the t-statistics are based on robust standard errors and 
are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. The annualized alphas to each portfolio are in 
percentages based on monthly returns. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. The average number of stocks in the long and short portfolios 
(averaged across all months) is shown for the four factor model. 
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TABLE 6, PANEL A: PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS –EQUALLY WEIGHTED RETURNS (CONTINUED) 
 
Portfolio 
“6m12” Four Factors Model Three Factors Model  Market Factor Model 
  Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short 
Alpha (Monthly) 0.516** 0.062 0.416 0.442* -0.016 0.447 0.738** 0.141 0.479 
(2.04) (0.19) (0.95) (1.72) (0.05) (1.05) (2.57) (0.43) (1.13) 
Alpha (Annual) 6.37% 0.75% 5.11% 5.43% -0.19% 5.50% 9.22% 1.71% 5.90%
Average Monthly 
Number of Firms 13 15.2 - 13 15.2 - 13 15.2 - 
N 321 224 211 321 224 211 321 224 211
Adj. R-squared 0.613 0.587 0.010 0.611 0.571 0.011 0.532 0.526 0
 
Portfolio 
“12m12” Four Factors Model Three Factors Model  Market Factor Model 
  Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short 
Alpha (Monthly) 0.529 -0.293 1.235** 0.388 -0.425 1.296** 0.581* -0.256 1.266***
(1.54) (1.08) (2.24) (1.13) (1.59) (2.47) (1.85) (0.93) (2.65) 
Alpha (Annual) 6.54% -3.46% 15.87% 4.76% -4.98% 16.71% 7.20% -3.03% 16.30%
Average Monthly 
Number of Firms 12.8 16.1 - 12.8 16.1 - 12.8 16.1 - 
N 319 237 216 319 237 216 319 237 216 
Adj. R-squared 0.466 0.62 0.002 0.459 0.606 0.005 0.416 0.575 0.011 
 
Portfolio 
“12m24” Four Factors Model Three Factors Model  Market Factor Model 
  Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short 
Alpha (Monthly) 0.401** 0.039 0.419 0.292* -0.067 0.407 0.525*** 0.039 0.461* 
(2.30) (0.17) (1.44) (1.65) (0.31) (1.45) (2.7) (0.18) (1.68) 
Alpha (Annual) 4.92% 0.47% 5.15% 3.56% -0.80% 4.99% 6.49% 0.47% 5.67%
Average Monthly 
Number of Firms 23.7 22.5 - 23.7 22.5 - 23.7 22.5 -
N 388 350 349 388 350 349 388 350 349
Adj. R-squared 0.679 0.623 0.001 0.671 0.617 0.004 0.603 0.593 0
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TABLE 6, PANEL B: PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS –VALUE WEIGHTED RETURNS (CONTINUED) 
 
Portfolio 
“6m12” Four Factors Model Three Factors Model  Market Factor Model 
  Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short 
Alpha (Monthly) -0.004 -0.132 0.253 -0.047 -0.171 0.278 -0.006 -0.123 0.251 
(0.01) (0.43) (0.53) (0.13) (0.56) (0.58) (0.02) (0.4) (0.51) 
Alpha (Annual) -0.05% -1.57% 3.08% -0.56% -2.03% 3.39% -0.07% -1.47% 3.05% 
Average Monthly 
Number of Firms 13 15.2 - 13 15.2 - 13 15.2 - 
N 321 224 211 321 224 211 321 224 211 
Adj. R-squared 0.453 0.546 0.038 0.454 0.543 0.041 0.443 0.533 0.001 
 
Portfolio 
“12m12” Four Factors Model Three Factors Model  Market Factor Model 
  Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short 
Alpha (Monthly) 0.231 -0.349 1.363** 0.125 -0.398 1.263** 0.232 -0.416 1.34** 
(0.58) (1.28) (2.35) (0.34) (1.54) (2.34) (0.68) (1.58) (2.57) 
Alpha (Annual) 2.81% -4.11% 17.64% 1.51% -4.67% 16.25% 2.82% -4.88% 17.32%
Average Monthly 
Number of Firms 12.8 16.1 - 12.8 16.1 - 12.8 16.1 - 
N 319 237 216 319 237 216 319 237 216 
Adj. R-squared 0.388 0.602 0.035 0.386 0.603 0.036 0.38 0.592 0.001 
 
Portfolio 
“12m24” Four Factors Model Three Factors Model  Market Factor Model 
  Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short Long Short 
Long - 
Short 
Alpha (Monthly) -0.008 -0.167 0.154 -0.06 -0.129 0.054 0.024 -0.165 0.149 
(0.04) (0.69) (0.50) (0.28) (0.53) (0.17) (0.12) (0.67) (0.47) 
Alpha (Annual) -0.10% -1.99% 1.86% -0.72% -1.54% 0.65% 0.29% -1.96% 1.80%
Average Monthly 
Number of Firms 23.7 22.5 - 23.7 22.5 - 23.7 22.5 -
N 388 350 349 388 350 349 388 350 349 
Adj. R-squared 0.584 0.557 0.047 0.583 0.558 0.042 0.577 0.535 0.001 
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TABLE 7: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Table 7 presents reverse causality regressions to explain the adoption (in Panel A) and removal (in Panel B) of 
a staggered board as a function of the valuation of the firm (as captured by Q[t]) plus other characteristics. The 
sample for Panel B (A) includes all firms that do (not) have a staggered board up until (and including) the year 
in which they remove (adopt) the staggered board if there is any such change, and are dropped from the 
sample afterwards. Each panel shows three models. Column (1) uses a random effects Probit model, with 
robust standard errors clustered by firm and reporting marginal effects. Column (2) uses the Cox proportional 
hazard model (see Greene, 2000, page 950) and reports the hazard ratio using robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level (after standardizing the continuous variables to have zero mean and unit variance). Dual-class 
stocks are removed from the sample. The economic effect in Column (1) is estimated as the marginal effect 
times one standard deviation in Q[t-1] divided by the average unconditional probability in the sample for that 
model. In Column (2) the economic effect is estimated as the difference between the hazard ratio and one 
and is recorded as a percentage. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are shown in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. All control variables are defined in Table 1. The sample in the table refers to the time 
period 1978-2011.  

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TABLE 7: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS (CONTINUED) 
 
PANEL A. PREDICT STAGGERING UP 
 Random  
Dep. Variable is: Pr ((Stagger in period t) Effects Cox 
Probit Model Model 
Variables (1) (2) 
Q[t-1] -0.007*** 0.422*** 
(3.76) (7.63) 
Ln (Assets) [t-1] -0.0003 1.11* 
(0.45) (1.69) 
Delaware Incorporation[t-1] -0.001 0.791** 
(0.47) (2.14) 
ROA[t-1] 0.031* 1.473*** 
(1.66) (5.06) 
Capital Expense/Assets[t-1] 0.056** 1.124** 
(2.24) (2.45) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] -0.073** 0.897 
(2.47) (1.55) 
 
Percentage Effect (i.e., Economic Significance) -29.3% -57.8% 
N 15,359 14,535 
Pseudo R-2 - 0.04 
Adjusted R-2 
- 
 - 
Wald Chi-2 (p-value) 42.9 (0.00) - 
# of firms in regression  1,784 1,651 
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 TABLE 7: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS (CONTINUED) 
 
PANEL B. PREDICT DE-STAGGERING 
 
 
 
  
Random  
Dep. Variable is: Pr (De-stagger in period t) Effects Cox 
Probit Model Model 
Variables (1) (2) 
Q[t-1] 0.001 0.857 
(0.74) (1.45) 
Ln (Assets) [t-1] 0.007*** 1.83*** 
(12.74) (6.23) 
Delaware Incorporation[t-1] 0.003 1.019 
(1.68) (0.12) 
ROA[t-1] -0.019 1.045 
(1.36) (0.42) 
Capital Expense/Assets[t-1] -0.03 1.029 
(1.42) (0.5) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] 0.002 0.992 
(0.11) (0.09) 
 
Percentage Effect (i.e., Economic Significance) -4.8% -14.3% 
N 17,368 13,462 
Pseudo R-2 - 0.027 
Adjusted R-2 - - 
Wald Chi-2 (p-value) 161.6 (0.00) - 
# of firms in regression  1,813 1,494 
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TABLE 8. FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: CONTROLLING FOR LAGGED Q (I.E., Q[T-1]) 
REPLICATION OF TABLE 3 
 
Table 8 shows a replication of Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) with two different sets of control variables and 
across different time periods. Columns (1)-(4) include the following control variables: Q[t-1]ǡ Staggered Board[t-1]ǡ 
Ln (Assets)[t-1]ǡ Delaware Incorporation[t-1]ǡ ROA[t-1]ǡ CAPX/Assets[t-1]ǡ and R&D/ Sales[t-1]Ǥ Column (5) adds these 
control variables: G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1]ǡ Insider Ownership[t-1]ǡ and Insider Ownership2[t-1]Ǥ
The analysis includes the following sub-periods: 1978-2011, 1978-1989, 1990-2000, 2001-2011, and 1995-
2002. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions where year and industry fixed effects are always 
included. All control variables are defined in Table 1. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
For the key independent variable—Staggered Board[t-1]— we show two separate standard errors: “(.)” reflects 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level; “[.]” reflects robust standard errors that are not clustered.  
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TABLE 8. FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: CONTROLLING FOR LAGGED Q (I.E., Q[T-1]) 
REPLICATION OF TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Period: 
1978- 
2011 
1978- 
1989 
1990- 
2000 
2001- 
2011 
1995- 
2002 
Q[t-1] 0.767*** 0.801*** 0.694*** 0.756*** 0.674*** 
 (91.25) (39.11) (38.52) (66.69) (32.55) 
Staggered Board[t-1] -0.008 -0.001 -0.009 -0.01 -0.018 
(firm cluster) (1.35) (0.16) (0.69) (1.15) (0.99) 
[no cluster] [1.4] [0.14] [0.68] [1.06] [1.02] 
G-Index[t-1] - - - - -0.045** 
     (2.43) 
Ln (G-Index)[t-1] - - - - 0.428** 
     (2.39) 
Ln (Assets)[t-1] -0.003 -0.007** 0.007 -0.01*** 0.018** 
(1.43) (2.39) (1.28) (2.75) (2.27) 
Ln (Firm Age)[t-1] - - - - -0.008 
     (0.45) 
Delaware Incorporation[t-1] -0.005 0.007 -0.009 -0.01 -0.001 
 (0.76) (0.99) (0.65) (0.98) (0.03) 
Insider Ownership[t-1] - - - - 0.16 
     (0.94) 
Insider Ownership2[t-1] - - - - 0.049 
     (0.2) 
ROA[t-1] 0.628*** 0.284*** 1.154*** 0.582*** 1.209*** 
(9.63) (3.42) (6.94) (5.53) (5.79) 
CAPX/Assets[t-1] -0.366*** -0.426*** -0.442** -0.607*** -0.744*** 
(4.16) (4.56) (2.25) (3.49) (3) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] 0.689*** 1.504*** 1.847*** 0.572*** 1.552*** 
(5.24) (4.78) (5.54) (3.59) (3.7) 
     
N 28,464 7,479 8,596 12,389 5,027 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.779 0.762 0.762 0.774 0.772 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect No No No No No 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of firms in regression 2,800 1,028 1,290 1,971 943 
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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TABLE 9. FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
 
In Table 9 we present time-series analysis as in Table 4 that includes interactions with variables that capture 
investments and operational complexity. We include the following control variables: Ln (Assets)[t-1]ǡ Delaware 
Incorporation[t-1]ǡ ROA[t-1]ǡ CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/Sales[t-1], which we do not show for brevity (unless a 
variable is being interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). The interacted variables include the following: R&D/ 
Sales[t], Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t], Ranked Patent Citation Count[t], and Firm Size[t]. The sample period is 1978-
2011. Individual interactions vary in their availability, as noted by the observation count and year span for 
each estimated model.  All continuous variables in the interaction terms (R&D/ Sales[t], Intangible Assets/Total 
Assets[t], and Firm Size[t]) are demeaned prior to calculating their interactions with Staggered Board[t-1]. Estimation 
is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions. We include year and firm fixed effects. All interaction and 
control variables are defined in Table 1. Economic significance for the interactions of the continuous 
interacted variables is calculated as the coefficient estimate times the standard deviation of the interacted 
variable, divided by the sample average for Q[t]. Economic significance for Staggered Board[t-1] is calculated as its 
coefficient estimate divided by average Q[t]. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  T-statistics 
(in their absolute value) are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of 
the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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TABLE 9. FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY (CONTINUED) 
 
 Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.071** 0.059** 0.073** 0.06** 0.027 0.025 0.037 0.058** 
 (2.44) (2.11) (2.44) (2.13) (0.68) (0.65) (1.39) (2.11) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] 0.395 1.453***       
 (0.56) (2.73)       
Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t-1]   0.061 0.119***     
   (1.59) (3.75)     
Ranked Patent Citation Count[t-1]     0.036 0.158**   
     (0.39) (2.5)   
Firm Size[t-1]       -0.024 -0.005 
       (0.88) (0.21) 
R&D/ Salest-1 * Staggered Board[t-1] 1.962** -       
 (2.54) -       
Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t-1] * 
Staggered Board[t-1]   0.118*** -     
   (2.86) -     
Ranked Patent Citation Count[t-1] * 
Staggered Board[t-1] 
  
  0.229* -   
     (1.92) -   
Firm Size[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1]       0.037** - 
       (2.34) - 
         
Economic Significance (Staggered B.) 4.49% - 4.61% - 1.71% - 2.34% - 
Economic Significance (Int. Variable) 10.8% - 3.96% - 4.97% - 3.44% - 
Sample Period (Years) 1978 -
2011 
- 1978 -
2011 
- 1978 -
2003 
- 1978 -
2011 
- 
N 31,574 31,574 31,337 31,337 15,338 15,338 31,558 31,558 
Adjusted R-2 0.7149 0.7149 0.714 0.714 0.725 0.725 0.7146 0.7143 
Clustering of Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Firm & Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 10. FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH BOARD FEATURES AND GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS  
 
In Table 10 we present time-series analysis as in Table 4 that includes interactions with variables that capture 
board features and governance provisions. We include the following control variables: Ln (Assets)[t-1]ǡ Delaware 
Incorporation[t-1]ǡ ROA[t-1]ǡ CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/Sales[t-1], which we not show for brevity (unless a variable 
is being interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). The interacted variables include the following: CEO-Board Chairman 
Duality[t-1], and G-Index[t-1]. The sample period is 1978-2011. Individual interactions vary in their availability, as 
noted by the observation count and year span for each estimated model. The G-Index[t-1] is demeaned prior to 
calculating its interaction with Staggered Board[t-1]. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions. We 
include year and firm fixed effects. All interaction and control variables are defined in Table 1. Economic 
significance for the interactions of the continuous interacted variables is calculated as the coefficient estimate 
times the standard deviation of the interacted variable, divided by the sample average for Q[t]. Economic 
significance for Staggered Board[t-1] is calculated as its coefficient estimate divided by average Q[t]. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are shown in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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TABLE 10. FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH BOARD FEATURES AND GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS (CONTINUED) 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.091* 0.133*** 0.077** 0.077** 
(1.94) (2.97) (2.57) (2.58) 
CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t-1] -0.016 0.036**   
(0.57) (1.96)   
Governance Index[t-1]   -0.015** -0.013** 
  (2.4) (2.44) 
CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t-1] * 
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.089*** -   
(2.80) -   
Governance Index[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1]   0.004 - 
  (0.64) - 
Economic Significance (Staggered B.) 6.26% - 4.86% - 
Economic Significance (Int. Variable) 5.10% - 1.28% - 
Sample Period (Years) 1996 -
2011 
- 1978 -
2011 
- 
N 18,552 18,552 23,525 23,525 
Adjusted R-2 0.73 0.73 0.711 0.711 
Clustering of Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Firm & Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 TABLE 11. FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS  
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
 
In Table 11 we present time-series analysis as in Table 4 that includes interactions with variables that 
capture executive compensation. We include the following control variables: Ln (Assets)[t-1]ǡ Delaware 
Incorporation[t-1]ǡ ROA[t-1]ǡ CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/Sales[t-1], which we do not show for brevity 
(unless a variable is being interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). The interacted variables include the 
following: CEO Delta[t-1], CEO Vega[t-1], and CEO Total Compensation[t-1]. The sample period is 1978-
2011. Individual interactions vary in their availability, as noted by the observation count and year 
span for each estimated model. All continuous variables in the interaction terms (CEO Delta[t-1], CEO 
Vega[t-1] and CEO Total Compensation[t-1]) are demeaned prior to calculating their interactions with 
Staggered Board[t-1]. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions. We include year and firm 
fixed effects. All interaction and control variables are defined in Table 1. Economic significance for 
the interactions of the continuous interacted variables is calculated as the coefficient estimate times 
the standard deviation of the interacted variable, divided by the sample average for Q[t]. Economic 
significance for Staggered Board[t-1] is calculated as its coefficient estimate divided by average Q[t]. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are shown 
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
  
TABLE 11. FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS  
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (CONTINUED) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.116** 0.12** 0.127** 0.153*** 0.104** 0.126*** 
(2.57) (2.63) (2.53) (3.04) (2.52) (2.85) 
CEO Delta[t-1] 0.053*** 0.058***     
(4.65) (7.59)     
CEO Vega[t-1]   -0.072 0.025   
  (1.31) (0.56)   
CEO Total Compensation[t-1]     0.086*** 0.122*** 
    (4.31) (8.89) 
CEO Delta[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1] 0.009      
(0.59)      
CEO Vega[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1]   0.203***    
  (2.87)    
CEO Total Compensation[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1]     0.062**  
    (2.45)  
Economic Significance (Staggered B.) 6.62% - 7.26% - 5.97% - 
Economic Significance (Int. Variable) 1.79% - 5.53% - 5.43% - 
Sample Period (Years) 1992 - 2010 - 1992 - 2010 - 1992 - 2011 - 
N 17,573 17,573 15,983 15,983 17,965 17,965 
Adjusted R-2 0.743 0.743 0.733 0.733 0.739 0.739 
Clustering of Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.1: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
 
Table A.1 shows a replication of Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) with two different sets of control variables. 
Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the following control variables: Staggered Board[t-1], G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], 
Ln (Assets)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Delaware Incorporation[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/ Sales[t-1]. In 
addition, column (5) includes Q[t-1]. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include the following control variables: Staggered 
Board[t-1], G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Assets)[t-1],Ln (Firm Age)[t-1],Delaware Incorporation[t-1],Insider Ownership[t-
1], Insider Ownership2[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/ Sales[t-1]. In addition, column (6) includes Q[t-
1].The analysis includes 1978-2011 data. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions where year 
and industry fixed effects are included in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). All control variables are defined in 
Table 1. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, 
respectively, in two tailed tests, based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. For the key independent 
variable—Staggered Board[t-1]— we show two separate standard errors: “(.)” reflects robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level; “[.]” reflects robust standard errors that are independently clustered at the firm and 
year level.  
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APPENDIX TABLE A.1: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS (CONTINUED) 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Q[t-1] - - - - 0.773*** 0.759*** 
 - - - - (73.05) (63.98) 
Staggered Board[t-1] -0.059*** -0.043* 0.08** 0.115** -0.015** -0.011 
(firm level cluster) (2.65) (1.72) (2.43) (2.53) (1.97) (1.16) 
[firm & year level cluster] [2.85] [1.89] -0.007 0.007 [2.42] [1.29] 
G-Index[t-1] -0.01 -0.036 (0.58) (0.27) -0.005 -0.014* 
 (0.96) (1.63) -0.068 -0.2 (1.45) (1.78) 
Ln (G-Index)[t-1] 0.011 0.274 (0.86) (0.93) 0.044 0.137* 
 (0.14) (1.32) -0.159*** -0.226*** (1.56) (1.77) 
Ln (Assets)[t-1] -0.009 -0.006 (7.47) (8.57) -0.006** -0.006 
(0.91) (0.53) -0.053 0.006 (2.23) (1.46) 
Ln (Firm Age)[t-1] -0.02 -0.027 (1.28) (0.09) 0.003 0.01 
 (1.48) (1.09)     (0.8) (1.16) 
Delaware Incorporation[t-1] -0.012 -0.021     -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.50) (0.77)  0.162 (0.31) (0.5) 
Insider Ownership[t-1] - 0.188  (0.66) - 0.102 
 - (0.81)   -0.341 - (1.06) 
Insider Ownership2[t-1] - -0.228   (1.1) - -0.07 
 - (0.73) 3.547*** 3.532*** - (0.48) 
ROA[t-1] 5.308*** 5.745*** (19.31) (17.44) 0.58*** 0.664*** 
(24.58) (23.88) 0.163 0.194 (7.16) (6.33) 
CAPX/Assets[t-1] -0.626** -0.719* (0.75) (0.69) -0.364*** -0.378*** 
(2.08) (1.9) 1.79** 0.572 (3.58) (2.83) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] 4.331*** 4.213*** (2.58) (0.7) 0.905*** 0.829*** 
(8.09) (7.29) 0.08** 0.115** (4.61) (3.74) 
      
N 19,743 14,376 19,743 14,376 18,522 13,742 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.566 0.58 0.707 0.724 0.8 0.798 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm Effect No No Yes Yes No No 
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.2: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS – FIRST DIFFERENCES 
Table A.2, Panel A presents pooled panel first difference regressions with the dependent variable being the 
change in Q from t to t+1 in column (1) (i.e., ¨ Q[t, t+1]), the change in Q from t to t+2 in column (2) (i.e., ¨ 
Q[t, t+2]) , the change in Q from t to t+3 in column (3) (i.e., ¨ Q[t, t+3]), the change in Q from t to t+4 in 
column (4) (i.e., ¨ Q[t, t+4]), and the change in Q from t to t+5 in column (5) (i.e., ¨ Q[t, t+5]). Table A.2, Panel 
B presents pooled panel first difference regressions with the dependent variable being the change in Q from 
t-1 to t in column (1) (i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t]), the change in Q from t-1 to t+1 in column (2) (i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t+1]) , the 
change in Q from t-1 to t+2 in column (3) (i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t+2]), , the change in Q from t-1 to t+3 in column (4) 
(i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t+3]), and the change in Q from t-1 to t+4 in column (5) (i.e., ¨ Q[t-1, t+4]).  As independent 
variables, we include the following: ¨Staggered Board[t-1], ¨G-Index[t-1], ¨Ln (G-Index)[t-1], ¨Ln (Assets)[t-1],¨Ln 
(Firm Age)[t-1],¨Insider Ownership[t-1], ¨Insider Ownership2[t-1], ¨ROA[t-1], ¨CAPX/Assets[t-1], and ¨R&D/ Sales[t-1]. 
The change in the indicator variable, ¨Delaware Incorporation[t-1], is not included due to limited variation. Sample 
period is 1978-2011, but varies per model due to availability of lagged data and is reported for each model. 
Regressions exclude fixed effects at the firm, year, or industry levels. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. Results are robust to an adjustment to the standard errors for autocorrelation as in Newey-West (where 
the adjustment includes up to sixth lags). T-statistics (in their absolute value) of the regression coefficients are 
shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two tailed tests. All control variables are defined in 
Table 1. Our sample for Column (1) in Panel A includes 351 cases of staggering up and 307 cases of 
staggering down. Our sample for Column (1) in Panel B includes 341 cases of staggering up and 272 cases of 
staggering down. The number of firms per regression model is noted in the table. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.2, PANEL A. FUTURE CHANGES IN Q VS. PAST CHANGES IN CONTROL VARIABLES
Dep. Variable: ¨ Q[t, t+1] ¨ Q[t, t+1] ¨ Q[t, t+2] ¨ Q[t, t+2] ¨ Q[t, t+3] ¨ Q[t, t+3] ¨ Q[t, t+4] ¨ Q[t, t+4] ¨ Q[t, t+5] ¨ Q[t, t+5] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
¨ Staggered Board[t-1] 0.038** 0.043* 0.072** 0.128*** 0.093*** 0.152*** 0.08** 0.12* 0.116** 0.169** 
 (2.12) (1.83) (2.47) (3.13) (2.92) (3.21) (2.09) (1.94) (2.62) (2.37) 
¨ G-Index[t-1] -0.012 -0.028* 0.004 0.025 -0.004 0.0001 0.003 0.011 -0.001 -0.007 
 (1.63) (1.69) (0.36) (1.20) (0.32) (0.02) (0.24) (0.38) (0.09) (0.23) 
¨ Ln (G-Index)[t-1] 0.112** 0.239 0.02 -0.154 0.187** 0.155 0.182** 0.083 0.296*** 0.283 
 (2.17) (1.52) (0.27) (0.87) (2.15) (0.60) (1.97) (0.32) (3.05) (1.17) 
¨ Ln (Assets)[t-1] -0.281*** -0.305*** -0.473*** -0.549*** -0.517*** -0.601*** -0.53*** -0.606*** -0.573*** -0.643*** 
(10.39) (9.16) (12.18) (11.49) (11.44) (10.77) (11.42) (10.83) (10.98) (9.79) 
¨ Ln (Firm Age)[t-1] 0.016 -0.019 0.107 0.174 0.165 0.214 0.257 0.372 0.214 0.376 
 (0.29) (0.18) (1.07) (1.09) (1.25) (0.98) (1.60) (1.40) (1.16) (1.25) 
¨ Insider Ownership[t-1] - -0.055 - 0.188 - 0.279 - 0.168 - 0.672** 
 - (0.24) - (0.69) - (1.12) - (0.68) - (2.44) 
¨ Insider Ownership2[t-1] - 0.182 - -0.142 - -0.174 - -0.059 - -0.457 
 - (0.77) - (0.51) - (0.67) - (0.23) - (1.56) 
¨ ROA[t-1] -0.183* -0.161 -0.598*** -0.804*** -1.239*** -1.582*** -1.313*** -1.867*** -1.386*** -1.901*** 
(1.74) (1.31) (5.01) (5.12) (8.46) (7.61) (8.35) (8.05) (8.18) (7.34) 
¨ CAPX/Assets[t-1] -0.644*** -1.034*** -0.754*** -1.125*** -0.872*** -1.29*** -0.934*** -1.333*** -0.828*** -1.248*** 
(3.72) (4.73) (3.78) (4.4) (4.23) (4.42) (4.68) (4.49) (3.64) (3.87) 
¨ R&D/ Sales[t-1] 0.979 0.783 0.438 0.178 -0.039 -0.862 0.649 -0.61 0.314 -0.491 
(1.53) (1.39) (0.66) (0.27) (0.05) (1.03) (0.89) (0.79) (0.37) (0.49) 
          
N 18,428 12,469 17,555 11,699 16,667 10,925 15,783 10,170 14,914 9,425
Adjusted R-Squared 0.014 0.016 0.022 0.029 0.024 0.03 0.023 0.028 0.023 0.026
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APPENDIX TABLE A.2: PANEL B. FUTURE CHANGES IN Q VS. PAST CHANGES IN CONTROL VARIABLES WITH STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AT 
THE FIRM LEVEL
 
Dep. Variable: ¨ Q[t-1, t] ¨ Q[t-1, t] ¨ Q[t-1, ¨ Q[t-1, ¨ Q[t-1, ¨ Q[t-1, ¨ Q[t-1, ¨ Q[t-1, ¨ Q[t-1, ¨ Q[t-1, 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
¨ Staggered Board[t-1] 0.056*** 0.048* 0.091*** 0.085** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.157*** 0.212*** 0.147*** 0.188*** 
 (3.27) (1.75) (3.67) (2.54) (3.87) (3.69) (4.63) (4.09) (3.57) (2.78) 
¨ G-Index[t-1] -0.001 0.033 -0.013 0.006 0 0.046* -0.009 0.021 -0.002 0.033 
 (0.14) (1.62) (1.34) (0.24) (0) (1.79) (0.69) (0.78) (0.13) (1.22) 
¨ Ln (G-Index)[t-1] -0.007 -0.363* 0.096 -0.123 0.022 -0.417* 0.194** -0.112 0.197** -0.19 
 (0.12) (1.9) (1.51) (0.57) (0.28) (1.85) (2.26) (0.47) (2.20) (0.80) 
¨ Ln (Assets)[t-1] -0.252*** -0.295*** -0.542*** -0.607*** -0.719*** -0.833*** -0.759*** -0.883*** -0.762*** -0.868*** 
(8.24) (7.74) (14.27) (13.51) (15.54) (15.32) (15.35) (14.94) (14.36) (13.89) 
¨ Ln (Firm Age)[t-1] 0.119** 0.185* 0.164 0.178 0.264* 0.348 0.315* 0.396 0.426** 0.59* 
 (2.14) (1.78) (1.67) (0.99) (1.94) (1.56) (1.86) (1.43) (2.19) (1.87) 
¨ Insider Ownership[t-1] - -0.212 - -0.285 - -0.081 - -0.018 - -0.07 
 - (1.09) - (1.32) - (0.33) - (0.07) - (0.25) 
¨ Insider Ownership2[t-1] - 0.084 - 0.285 - -0.003 - -0.001 - 0.055 
 - (0.46) - (1.28) - (0.01) - (0.01) - (0.2) 
¨ ROA[t-1] 2.428*** 2.634*** 2.279*** 2.509*** 1.885*** 1.918*** 1.275*** 1.193*** 1.39*** 1.245*** 
(17.19) (14.76) (14.47) (12.73) (11.79) (9.42) (7.94) (5.82) (8.03) (5.6) 
¨ CAPX/Assets[t-1] -0.363* -0.421* -0.994*** -1.459*** -1.091*** -1.486*** -1.256*** -1.725*** -1.26*** -1.611*** 
(1.80) (1.81) (5.25) (5.80) (5.73) (5.53) (6.21) (6.19) (5.28) (5.27) 
¨ R&D/ Sales[t-1] -1.065 -1.525** -0.184 -0.78 -0.671 -1.343 -1.284 -2.621*** -0.355 -2.338** 
(1.65) (2.44) (0.31) (1.18) (0.93) (1.68) (1.57) (3.11) (0.34) (2.52) 
          
N 18,775 12,710 18,363 12,429 17,495 11,663 16,608 10,890 15,726 10,137 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.066 0.075 0.058 0.066 0.055 0.062 0.045 0.052 0.04 0.045 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.3: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Table A.3 presents reverse causality regressions to explain the adoption (in Panel A) and removal (in Panel B) 
of a staggered board as a function of the valuation of the firm (as captured by Q[t]) plus other characteristics. 
The sample for Panel B (A) includes all firms that do (not) have a staggered board up until (and including) the 
year in which they remove (adopt) the staggered board if there is any such change, and are dropped from the 
sample afterwards. Each panel shows three sets of models. Columns (1) and (2) use a random effects Probit 
model, with robust standard errors clustered by firm and reporting marginal effects. Columns (3) and (4) use 
the Cox proportional hazard model (Greene, 2000) and report the hazard ratio using robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level (after standardizing the continuous variables to have zero mean and unit variance). 
Dual-class stocks are removed from the sample. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two tailed tests. T-statistics (in their absolute value) 
are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All control variables are defined in Table 1. The 
sample in the table refers to the time period 1978-2011.
  

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APPENDIX TABLE A.3: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS 
(CONTINUED) 
PANEL A. PREDICT STAGGERING UP 
 
 Random Random   
Dep. Variable is: Pr (Stagger in t) Effects Effects Cox Cox 
Probit 
Model 
Probit 
Model Model Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q[t-1] -0.005*** -0.001** 0.419*** 0.493*** 
 (2.64) (2.25) (6.35) (3.14) 
G-Index[t-1]  -0.005*** -0.001 0.472 0.411 
  (2.94) (0.99) (1.43) (0.93) 
Ln (G-Index)[t-1]  0.057*** 0.008 4.761*** 6.601 
  (3.6) (1.29) (2.68) (1.61) 
Ln (Assets)[t-1] -0.001 -0.00002 1.17* 1.105 
(1.64) (0.13) (1.94) (0.65) 
Ln (Firm Age)[t-1]  -0.002* -0.00024 1.065 1.344 
  (1.83) (0.53) (0.75) (1.2) 
Delaware Incorporation[t-1] -0.002 -0.00049 0.96 0.956 
(1.06) (0.85) (0.54) (0.32) 
Insider Ownership[t-1]   0.00025  0.952 
   (0.07)  (0.18) 
Insider Ownership2[t-1]   0.001  1.205 
   (0.1)  (0.97) 
ROA[t-1] 0.028** 0.005 1.65*** 1.669** 
(2.09) (1.07) (4.83) (2.37) 
CAPX/Assets[t-1] 0.048** 0.002 1.215*** 1.074 
(2.62) (0.51) (2.78) (0.5) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] -0.028 -0.002 0.938 1.07 
(1.49) (0.36) (0.56) (0.34) 
    
N 9,335 6,067 8,772 5,542 
Pseudo R-2 - - 0.059 0.062 
Adjusted R-2 - - - - 
Wald Chi-2 (p-value) 
61.5 
(0.00) 
18.18 
(0.078) - - 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.3: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS 
(CONTINUED) 
PANEL B. PREDICT DE-STAGGERING 
 
 Random Random   
Dep. Variable is: Pr (Stagger in t) Effects Effects Cox Cox 
Probit 
Model 
Probit 
Model Model Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q[t-1] -0.001 -0.00033 1.083 1.038 
 (1.05) (0.18) (0.43) (0.17) 
G-Index[t-1]  0.001 -0.003 2.326 2.968** 
  (0.47) (1.45) (1.32) (2.1) 
Ln (G-Index)[t-1]  -0.005 0.042* 0.304 0.205** 
  (0.33) (1.86) (1.3) (2.19) 
Ln (Assets)[t-1] -0.005*** -0.006*** 1.753*** 1.75*** 
(7.26) (6.66) (3.93) (3.78) 
Ln (Firm Age)[t-1]  -0.007*** -0.008*** 1.31 1.115 
  (4.23) (3.26) (1.11) (0.42) 
Delaware Incorporation[t-1] -0.001 -0.00039 1.016 0.969 
(0.54) (0.17) (0.15) (0.3) 
Insider Ownership[t-1]   0.04387  0.53 
   (1.57)  (1.61) 
Insider Ownership2[t-1]   -0.073**  1.749** 
   (2.21)  (2.01) 
ROA[t-1] 0.03* 0.019 0.964 0.998 
(1.78) (0.83) (0.22) (0.01) 
CAPX/Assets[t-1] 0.021 0.037 0.994 0.954 
(0.86) (1.17) (0.06) (0.47) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] -0.024 -0.043* 1.075 1.105 
(1.16) (1.69) (0.57) (0.8) 
    
N 10,745 8,537 7605 5924 
Pseudo R-2 - - 0.023 0.032 
Adjusted R-2 - - - - 
Wald Chi-2 (p-value) 
116.9 
(0.00) 
108.3 
(0.00) - - 

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APPENDIX TABLE A.4: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
Table A.4 presents time-series analysis as in Table 4 that includes interactions with variables that capture 
investments and operational complexity. We include the following control variables. In columns(1), (3), (5) 
and (7) we include: Staggered Board[t-1], G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Assets)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Delaware 
Incorporation[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/ Sales[t-1], which we do not show for brevity (unless a 
variable is being interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). In columns(2), (4), (6) and (8) we include: Staggered Board[t-
1], G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Assets)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Delaware Incorporation[t-1], Insider Ownership[t-1],
Insider Ownership2[t-1], ROA[t-1],CAPX/Assets[t-1],and R&D/ Sales[t-1], which we do not show for brevity (unless 
a variable is being interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). The interacted variables include the following: R&D/ 
Sales[t], Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t], Ranked Patent Citation Count[t], and Firm Size[t]. The sample period is 
1978-2011. Individual interactions vary in their availability, as noted by the observation count and year span 
for each estimated model. All continuous variables in the interaction terms (R&D/ Sales[t], Intangible 
Assets/Total Assets[t], and Firm Size[t]) are demeaned prior to calculating their interactions with Staggered Board[t-
1]. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] regressions. We include (but do not show for brevity) year and 
firm fixed effects. All interaction and control variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, 
respectively, in two tailed tests. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.4: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY (CONTINUED) 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.101*** 0.129*** 0.097*** 0.131*** 0.059 0.073 0.053* 0.057 
 (2.96) (2.87) (2.72) (2.64) (1.25) (0.88) (1.64) (1.26) 
R&D/ Sales[t-1] 0.177 -0.806 - - - - - - 
 (0.2) (0.84) - - - - - - 
Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t-1] - - 0.017 0.044 - - - - 
 - - (0.39) (0.81) - - - - 
Ranked Patent Citation Count[t-1] - - - - -0.051 0.096 - - 
 - - - - (0.45) (0.62) - - 
Firm Size[t-1] - - - - - - -0.009 -0.021 
 - - - - - - (0.27) (0.55) 
R&D/ Salest-1 * Staggered Board[t-1] 3.058*** 2.817*** - - - - - - 
 (3.39) (3.18) - - - - - - 
Intangible Assets/ Total Assets[t-1] * 
Staggered Board[t-1] - - 0.115** 0.109* 
- - - - 
 - - (2.48) (1.75) - - - - 
Ranked Patent Citation Count[t-1] * 
Staggered Board[t-1] 
- - - - 
0.309** 
0.179 - - 
 
- - - - 
(2.22) 
(1.01) - - 
Firm Size[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1] - - - - - - 0.04** 0.057** 
 - - - - - - (2.20) (2.37) 
         
Sample Period (Years) 1978 -
2011 
- 1978 -
2011 
- 1978 -
2003 
- 1978 -
2011 
- 
N 19,743 14,376 19,628 14,285 10,781 6,714 19,738 14,372 
Adjusted R-2 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.72 
Clustering of Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 

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APPENDIX TABLE A.5: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH BOARD FEATURES AND GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS  
In Table A.5 we present time-series analysis as in Table 4 that includes interactions with variables that capture 
board features and governance provisions. We include the following control variables. In columns(1) and (3) 
we include: Staggered Board[t-1], G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Assets)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Delaware Incorporation[t-
1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/ Sales[t-1], which we do not show for brevity (unless a variable is being 
interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). In columns(2) and (4) we include: Staggered Board[t-1], G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-
Index)[t-1], Ln (Assets)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Delaware Incorporation[t-1], Insider Ownership[t-1], Insider Ownership2[t-1], 
ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/ Sales[t-1], which we do not show for brevity (unless a variable is being 
interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). The sample period is 1978-2011. Individual interactions vary in their 
availability, as noted by the observation count and year span for each estimated model. The G-Index[t-1] is 
demeaned prior to calculating its interaction with Staggered Board[t-1]. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s 
Q[t] regressions. We include (but do not show for brevity) year and firm fixed effects. All interaction and 
control variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  T-statistics (in their 
absolute value) are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of the 
coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two tailed tests. 
 
79

APPENDIX TABLE A.5: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH BOARD FEATURES AND GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS (CONTINUED) 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.079** 0.111** 0.108* 0.11* 
(2.38) (2.09) (1.90) (1.96) 
CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t-1] -0.011 0.004 - - 
(0.83) (0.12) - - 
Governance Index[t-1] - - -0.036 -0.025 
- - (1.06) (0.74) 
Staggered Board[t-1] * CEO Turnover[t-1] - - - - 
- - - - 
CEO-Board Chairman Duality[t-1] * 
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.004 0.003 - - 
(0.60) (0.22) - - 
Governance Index[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1] - - 0.106*** 0.084** 
- - (2.90) (2.28) 
Sample Period (Years) 1996 -
2011 
- 1978 -
2011 
- 
N 19,743 14,376 10,841 9,930 
Adjusted R-2 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.76 
Clustering of Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 

  
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APPENDIX TABLE A.6: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS  
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
In Appendix Table A.6 we present time-series analysis as in Table 4 that includes interactions with variables 
that capture executive compensation. We include the following control variables. In columns(1), (3) and (5) 
we include: Staggered Board[t-1], G-Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Assets)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Delaware 
Incorporation[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/ Sales[t-1], which we do not show for brevity (unless a 
variable is being interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). In columns(2), (4) and (6) we include: Staggered Board[t-1], G-
Index[t-1], Ln (G-Index)[t-1], Ln (Assets)[t-1], Ln (Firm Age)[t-1], Delaware Incorporation[t-1], Insider Ownership[t-1], Insider 
Ownership2[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], and R&D/ Sales[t-1], which we do not show for brevity (unless a 
variable is being interacted with Staggered Board[t-1]). The interacted variables include the following: CEO Delta[t-
1], CEO Vega[t-1], and CEO Total Compensation[t-1]. The sample period is 1978-2011. Individual interactions vary 
in their availability, as noted by the observation count and year span for each estimated model. All continuous 
variables in the interaction terms (CEO Delta[t-1], CEO Vega[t-1] and CEO Total Compensation[t-1]) are demeaned 
prior to calculating their interactions with Staggered Board[t-1]. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin’s Q[t] 
regressions. We include (but do not show for brevity) year and firm fixed effects. All interaction and control 
variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  T-statistics (in their absolute 
value) are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of the coefficients is 
indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two tailed tests. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.6: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS  
INTERACTIONS OF STAGGERED BOARD WITH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (CONTINUED) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Staggered Board[t-1] 0.138** 0.135** 0.141** 0.132** 0.119** 0.112** 
(2.62) (2.56) (2.44) (2.33) (2.50) (2.37) 
CEO Delta[t-1] 0.057*** 0.054*** - - - - 
(4.05) (3.73) - - - - 
CEO Vega[t-1] - - -0.09 -0.09 - - 
- - (1.51) (1.49) - - 
CEO Total Compensation[t-1] - - - - 0.087*** 0.081*** 
- - - - (4.22) (3.72) 
CEO Delta[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1] 0.009 0.008 - - - - 
(0.52) (0.51) - - - - 
CEO Vega[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1] - - 0.221*** 0.227*** - - 
- - (2.89) (2.88) - - 
CEO Total Compensation[t-1] * Staggered Board[t-1] - - - - 0.066** 0.073** 
- - - - (2.4) (2.57) 
Sample Period (Years) 1992 - 2010 - 1992 - 2010 - 1992 - 2011 - 
N 11,466 10,593 10,439 9,664 11,582 10,732 
Adjusted R-2 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 
Clustering of Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
